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ABSTRACT 
The European Union has become a leading regional force 
in the progress towards a world free of state sanctioned judicial 
killing in the form of the death penalty. This article investi-
gates how the EU has evolved its abolitionist position. It ana-
lyzes the development of the region’s internal policy beginning 
in the European Parliament, to the rejection of the punishment 
being mandated as a Treaty provision, which evolves into an 
integral component of the external human rights project. The 
EU has now formulated technical bilateral and multilateral in-
itiatives to promote abolition worldwide. This is most clearly 
evidenced in the EU playing an important role in the 2007 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the moratori-
um on the use of the death penalty, and the strengthening of 
the resolution in 2008, 2010, and 2012. This article demon-
strates that the EU’s contribution to the abolition of the death 
penalty is a recognizable success story of human rights, and it 
is one aspect of the regions’ policies that was rewarded in 2012 
with the Nobel Peace Prize. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (hereinafter, “EU”) is initiating a 
“tireless” and “all out” campaign against the death penalty.1 
The region has formulated a “principled position”2 against the 
punishment in all cases without exception3, and will “continue 
to intensify its initiatives”4 until a death penalty free world is 
achieved. This anti-death penalty position is grounded within a 
human rights discourse, which is a “theme that lies at the 
heart of the EU.”5 The Treaty of Lisbon6 incorporated the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union7 (hereinafter, 
“Charter”) and provides for the accession of the EU to the 
Council of Europe’s (hereinafter, “CoE”) Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (herein-
after, “ECHR”).8 The last execution by an EU Member State 
                                                          
1 All Out Against the Death Penalty, EUR. COMM’N (June 20, 2007), 
http:/ec.europa.eu/news/externalrelations/0706201en.htm.  
2 See EU Policy on Death Penalty, EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERV. (stating “The 
European Union holds a strong and principled position against the death 
penalty”), http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/index_en.htm (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2013).   
3 See The Death Penalty Archive, in Delegation of the European Union to 
the United States, EUINTHEUS.ORG, http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-
do/policy-areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-and-capital-punishment 
/death-penalty/  (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (stating “The European Union is 
opposed to the death penalty in all cases and has consistently espoused its 
universal abolition”). 
4 EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty: revised and updated version, EUR. 
EXTERNAL ACTION SERV. (2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/ guide-
lines/death_penalty/docs/10015_08_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
5 See Steven Vanackere, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of Belgium, Opening Session, at the 12th Annual EU-NGO Forum of 
Human Rights: EU Human Rights Instruments and the Lisbon Treaty: State 
of Play and Way Forward, (July 12, 2010) (“The fight against the death pen-
alty is a theme that lies at the heart of the EU human rights approach. Also, 
for Belgium in particular, it remains an absolute policy priority.”). 
6 See generally Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Un-
ion and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 
2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].   
7 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 
2000 O.J. C 364/1, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter 
/pdf/text_en.pdf.  
8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, C.E.T.S. No. 5 (1950); Protocol Relating to Article 6(2) of the Trea-
ty on European Union on the Accession of the Union to the European Con-
vention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
2007 O.J. (C 306/01), at 155.    
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was Latvia in 1996.9 Latvia removed the death penalty from its 
domestic law in 2011 through the ratification of Protocol No. 13 
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Pen-
alty in all circumstances (hereinafter, “Protocol No. 13”).10  
The EU has developed human rights standards to frame 
abolitionism in the promotion of the protection of the right to 
life, the enhancement of human dignity, the prohibition against 
cruel and inhuman punishment, the necessity of ensuring ef-
fective representation, fair trials and appeals provisions, and 
the opportunity of a final commutation of sentence. These 
standards are now considered as providing an absolute aboli-
tionist position, which was affirmed by the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union in its 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action 
Plan on Human Rights and Democracy.11 All prospective Mem-
ber States must abolish the death penalty12 and this internal 
abolitionist standard is now reflected as an intricate component 
of the external project within bilateral and multilateral com-
munications. On this basis, the EU Guidelines on the Death 
Penalty - the first set of EU human rights guidelines adopted 
by the Council in 1998 – details the framework for diplomatic 
EU action, including objectives, circumstances and instru-
ments.13 The EU is constantly reviewing and evolving14 its poli-
cies to utilize the most effective abolitionist mechanisms. It is 
developing educational projects with the aim of increasing 
awareness of the issues surrounding the death penalty and 
providing an opportunity for civil society to take a stand 
                                                          
9 See Clemency Service, LATVIJAS VALSTS PREZIDENTS, 
http://www.president.lv/pk/content/?cat_id=9243&lng=en (last visited Oct. 7, 
2013). 
10 Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in 
all circumstances, May 3, 2002, C.E.T.S. No. 187.  
11 Press Release, European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action 
Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (June 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/13
1181.pdf.  
12 Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democra-
tisation in Third Countries, COM (2001) 252 final (May 2001). 
13 See EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, supra note 4.   
14 See, e.g., 12th EU NGO Forum on Human Rights, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/201/2
01009/20100913_ngoforumrecomms_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
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against the punishment, for instance, through participation in 
the, “World/European Day Against the Death Penalty,” which 
occurs every October 10th.15 These policies coincide with the 
extensive work undertaken by the CoE in the promotion of the 
abolition of the death penalty within its Member and Observer 
States, while also promoting abolition in retentionist states.16        
This article engages with the creative processes initiated to 
formulate the political hegemony and legal rejection of the pun-
ishment. Part II considers the internal abolition of the death 
penalty within the EU. It analyzes the prominent role of the 
European Parliament in transforming the question of the death 
penalty from an issue, which was initially thought to be outside 
of the region’s competence, to the removal of the punishment 
being intricately reflected as a crucial component of the EU 
project. The internal removal of the death penalty developed 
into a Treaty provision, and is solidified by the incorporation of 
the Charter for a specific internal abolition mechanism. Follow-
ing this, a review is provided of the political initiatives. It fo-
cuses on the dissemination and publication of demarches, and 
the role of bilateral and multilateral dialogue which can occur 
when a state’s capital judicial system is in flux or when execu-
tions are immanent.  
Part III engages with the EU’s external project, through 
the three themes of political dialogue, capacity building, and 
support for defense attorneys and non-governmental organiza-
tions. The work of the European External Action Service (here-
inafter, “EEAS”),17 and specifically, Catherine Ashton, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, has become increasingly important for the effective dis-
semination of the EU abolitionist discourse worldwide.18  
Part IV reviews the effectiveness of EU amicus curiae 
briefs filed with United States courts. This section engages 
                                                          
15 Press Release, European External Action Service, European and World 
Day against the Death Penalty, EU underlines commitment to universal abo-
lition, (Oct. 10, 2013), available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/ 
docs/2013/131010_01_en.pdf. 
16 See Jon Yorke, The Right to Life and Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
the Council of Europe, 34 EUR. L. REV. 205 (2009); Jon Yorke, Inhuman and 
Degrading Punishment and Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Council of 
Europe, 16 EUR. PUB. L. 77 (2010).  
17 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 6, at 23-24. 
18 Id. at 24, 99.  
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with the judicial consideration of the question of the extent to 
which the death penalty is reserved as an exclusive state sov-
ereign issue to be determined in isolation of international opin-
ion and law. The work of the EU in the United Nations is ana-
lyzed in Part V, and its important contribution towards the 
first General Assembly resolution calling for a worldwide mora-
torium on the use of the death penalty. Finally, the abolition of 
the death penalty as a thematic issue of the European Initia-
tive for Democracy and Human Rights (hereinafter, “EIDHR”) 
is reviewed, through the EU’s contribution to capacity building 
for capital defense within the United States, Africa, and Asia.  
What this article demonstrates is that the EU has become 
a leading regional force for the progress towards global aboli-
tion of the death penalty.19         
II.  INTERNAL POLICY AND THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY 
A. The Evolution of the Political Process   
The initial promotion of the abolition of the death penalty 
in the region came from the European Parliament. Yet the first 
steps were cautious and modest. In 1979, a question was put to 
the Council by a member of the European Parliament, Mr. 
Schwartzenberg, on the possibility of the region moving to-
wards a homogenous position against the punishment. He 
asked:  
[d]oes the Council not feel called upon to recommend the harmo-
nization by the Community Member States of legislation on the 
death penalty in view of its commitment in the preamble to the 
Treaties “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe?” 20 
The reply was:  
[t]he Council does not consider that the passage of the preamble 
to the Treaty establishing the EEC referred to by the Honourable 
Member contains an invitation to harmonize legislation on the 
death penalty.21     
                                                          
19 EU Policy on the Death Penalty, supra note 2. 
20 1981 O.J. (Annex to No. 250) 267 (Jan. 18, 1980). 
21 Id. 
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This early position demonstrated that the European Com-
munity (hereinafter, “EC”22) thought it more pertinent to leave 
questions concerning the legitimacy of the punishment to the 
Member States. At this time, the Council thought that there 
was no basis to invite Member States to harmonize an aboli-
tionist position. However, there was a growing reluctance by 
the Member States to impose the punishment. The Nether-
lands had a long-standing abolitionist tradition, as evidenced 
through the abolition of the punishment in 1869. Finland and 
(West) Germany removed the punishment from their laws in 
1949 (and East Germany did so in 1987), as did Austria in 
1968, the United Kingdom in 1969, Sweden in 1972, Spain in 
1975, Portugal in 1976, Denmark in 1978, Luxembourg in 
1979, and France in 1981.23 At this time, only Belgium and Ire-
land reserved the punishment for ordinary crimes, but it was 
not imposed in either country.24 
What this demonstrates is that the initial evolution in pe-
nology was not driven from a centralized EC position, but de-
veloped through the individual Member State rejection of the 
punishment. At this time, the region was not promoting 
change, but the Member States were evolving their policies in 
the rejection of the death penalty themselves. The punish-
ment’s failure as an effective deterrence against murder had 
been cogently demonstrated throughout Western Europe most 
clearly through a detailed empirical study from 1928,25 but fol-
                                                          
22 The “European Community” became the “European Union” following 
the adoption of the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) Febru-
ary 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) [hereinafter “Treaty of Masstricht”].   
23 See Robert Badinter, Preface to Moving Towards Universal Abolition of 
the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY: BEYOND ABOLITION 5, at 7 (Council of Eu-
rope ed., 2004).  
24
 In Belgium, the death penalty was retained but it was not applied and the 
country was considered de facto abolitionist. The last execution in Belgium was 
in 1950, and the punishment was abolished in 1996. It should be noted that Mi-
chael Manning was the last person to be executed in Ireland in 1954. The 
death penalty remained on the statute books until it was abolished in 1990, 
and then the Twenty First Amendment of the Constitutional Act 2001, Arti-
cle 15.5.2, explicitly prohibits the death penalty. See Twenty-First Amend-
ment of the Constitution Act, 2001, available at   
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2001/en/act/cam/0021/sched.html#sched-parti 
25 In 1928, the Howard League for Penal Reform compiled comparative 
data from Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Holland, and England. See THE 
ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN HOLLAND AND SCANDINAVIA 3 (S. 
Margery Fry ed., 2d ed. 1928) (Fry stated that in reviewing the data, “we can 
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lowing the adoption of the ECHR in 1950, the regional human 
rights principles were initially inconsistently applied to the ap-
plication of the death penalty.26   However, the gradual removal 
of the punishment from the Member States’ criminal legisla-
tion, predominantly for policy reasons in the recognition of the 
inutility of the punishment and a growing concern about the 
compatibility of the punishment with principles of humanitari-
anism, opened the door for a future centralized position against 
the punishment.27 In 1979, only France, in Western Europe, 
                                                                                                                                  
obtain evidence of probability, almost amounting to proof, that its abolition 
does not permanently raise [the murder rate]”); id. at 5 (Carl Torp, Professor 
of Penal Law at the University of Copenhagen stated that in Denmark, the 
non-application of the death penalty had, “not in any way contributed to an 
increase in the number of such crimes which were formally punished by 
death.”); id. at 8 (In Holland, Dr. J Simon van der Aa, stated, “since the aboli-
tion of capital punishment, the number of life sentences passed has shown a 
tendency to diminish.”); id. at 15 (Victor Almquist, the Head of the Swedish 
Prison Administration in 1928 stated, “[t]he reduction in the number of capi-
tal sentences and the final abolition of the penalty so far from leading to an 
increase of offences of this kind was actually followed by a noticeable de-
crease in crimes legally punishment by death”); see also REPORT OF THE 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1931) (a wide range of European 
perspectives was considered and the Belgium Minister of Justice stated in 
report for the Committee “[i]t seems inconceivable that a Minister of Justice 
should ever think it possible to establish a penalty the uselessness of which, 
to put it no higher, has been amply demonstrated,”); id. at 577. (The Danish 
Government submitted to the Committee stating “it seems unnecessary to 
propose the retention of capital punishment for the sake of public security”); 
id. at 584. In reviewing the evidence, the Committee concluded, “capital pun-
ishment may be abolished in [England] without endangering life or property, 
or impairing the security of society.” Id. at xcvi; see also Report of the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953) (1954) (The Royal Commis-
sion arrived at a similar conclusion to that of the Select Committee, and Lord 
Templewood reviewed the comparative arguments presented to the Royal 
Commission and stated that the, “conclusion seems to be inescapable that, 
whatever may be argued to the contrary, the existence of the death penalty 
makes little or no difference to the security of life.”). THE SHADOW OF THE 
GALLOWS: THE CASE AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 56 (1951). 
26 It is important to note here that at this time there was no formulated 
coherent European Union position on the death penalty and the gradual state 
by state removal of the punishment reflects that this was initially an issue 
being considered by the individual governments.  
27 See, e.g., ROGER HOOD ET AL., THE DEATH PENALTY: ABOLITION IN 
EUROPE (Council of Europe ed., 1999); ROBERT BADINTER ET AL., DEATH 
PENALTY: BEYOND ABOLITION (Council of Europe ed., 2004); HANS GÖRAN 
FRANCK, THE BARBARIC PUNISHMENT: ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY (Wil-
liam A. Schabas ed., 2003); ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH 
PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE, (4th ed. 2008);  SANGMIN BAE, WHEN 
THE STATE NO LONGER KILLS: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND 
ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2007); Evi Girling, European Identity 
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still implemented the death penalty as a punishment for ordi-
nary crimes and had carried out an execution in 1977.28 Then, 
in 1980, a member of the European Parliament, Mr. Rogers, 
raised a question on the death penalty to the conference of the 
Foreign Ministers.29 He noted the campaign of Amnesty Inter-
national and the early initiatives in the United Nations30 and 
asked that the Foreign Ministers “coordinate their policies on 
this matter with the aim of speaking with a single voice in the 
United Nations and other international bodies against” the 
death penalty.31 Mr. Zamberletti, the President-in-Office of the 
Foreign Ministers observed that the “ever increasing recourse 
to capital punishment for political reasons was intolerable”32 
                                                                                                                                  
and the Mission Against the Death Penalty in the United States, in The Cul-
tural Lives of Capital Punishment: Comparative Perspectives 112 (Austin 
Sarat & Christian Boulanger eds., 2005); Agata Fijalkowski, European Policy 
on the Death Penalty, in IS THE DEATH PENALTY DYING? EUROPEAN AND 
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 268 (Austin Sarat & Jürgen Martschukat eds., 
2011).     
28 HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 27, at 47. It should be noted that Michael Man-
ning was the last person to be executed in Ireland in 1954. The death penalty 
remained on the statute books until it was abolished in 1990, and then the 
Twenty First Amendment of the Constitutional Act 2001, Article 15.5.2, ex-
plicitly prohibits the death penalty. See Twenty-First Amendment of the 
Constitution Act, 2001, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ 
2001/en/act/cam/0021/sched.html#sched-parti 
29 1980 O.J. (C 117) 33.  
30 At the 1977 Stockholm Conference Amnesty International laid the 
platform for their campaign against the death penalty, see, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history . See generally, G.A. Res. 2857 
(XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/8588 (December 20, 1971). See also, Eric Prokosch, The 
Death Penalty Verses Human Rights, in Robert Hood et al., The Death Penal-
ty: Abolition in Europe 18 (Council of Europe ed., 1999).     
31 Supra note 29. 
32 In Europe an early argument for the rejection of the death penalty for 
political crimes was most cogently made by the nineteenth century French 
jurist, François Guizot, who wrote about the use of the death penalty during 
and after the French Revolution. Guizot stated, “[p]unishments may destroy 
men, but they can neither change the interests nor sentiments of the people . 
. . [the government] may kill one or several individuals, and severely chastise 
one or several conspiracies, but if it can do no more than this, it will find the 
same perils and the same enemies always before it. If it is able to do more, let 
it dispense with killing for it has no more need of it; less terrible remedies 
will suffice.” In the presence of mass civil unrest (terrorist violence) Guizot 
observed, “[w]e live in a society recently overturned, where legitimate and 
illegitimate interests, honourable and blameable sentiment, just and false 
ideas, are so mingled, that it is very difficult to strike hard without striking 
wrong[.]” A Treatise on Death Punishments, in GENERAL HISTORY OF 
CIVILISATION IN EUROPE: FROM THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE TILL THE 
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but that the then nine Member States had “not re-examined 
the question” of abolition.33 So the death penalty was still re-
served, and thus privileged, as a penological question for the 
Member States and not a competency question for the region. 
However, Mr. Rogers pressed the issue further when he re-
plied: 
[w]ould not the Foreign Ministers accept that, in spite of their 
constantly reiterated desire to speak with a single voice, it is ra-
ther anomalous that France alone in Western Europe applies the 
death penalty…[w]ould not the Ministers think this a rather 
anomalous situation that one country in the Community should 
still carry the death penalty?34  
Mr. Zamberletti confined his reply and reiterated that 
“[t]he view of the Nine is that the application of the death pen-
alty for political reasons is unacceptable” but the Member 
States of the EC will consider the question of the death penalty 
within the General Assembly of the United Nations.35  
However, this attempt to shift the focus to the human 
rights region of the UN did not prevent further questions being 
tabled to the Commission and the Council. In 1985, a Member 
of the European Parliament, Mr Willy Kuijpers, noted that 
Amnesty International regularly campaigned against the death 
penalty and so repeated the call for clarity within the EC.36 
                                                                                                                                  
FRENCH REVOLUTION 327, 277 (1848). Guizot’s observations on the rejection of 
the death penalty for political offences, can also be applied for modern terror-
ist crimes, and when Marc Ancel reviewed the French and British abolitionist 
arguments from the mid-nineteenth century, he stated, “[i]n France, Guizot 
and Charles Lucas represented this movement [those arguing against the 
death penalty for ‘reason of state’], which in 1848 ended with the removing of 
the death penalty for political crimes…the utilitarian current, which, in di-
verse forms, was evident from [Jeremy] Bentham to [John] Stuart Mill or to 
[Herbert] Spencer, and among jurists to [Pellegrino] Rossi, affirmed that it 
was proper to search for happiness and not for pain. In particular, punish-
ment should be ‘no more than just, nor more than necessary’; this led one log-
ically to ask, if it was ever really necessary to punish any offender by death 
regardless of his crime.” See The Problem of the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 3 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967).        
33 In 1980, the nine Member States were Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom.  
34 1980 O.J. (C 117) 33; see generally Robert Badinter, ABOLITION: ONE 
MAN’S BATTLE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (2008).      
35 Id.  
36 1985 O.J. (C 276) 28 (asking “[c]an the Commission say: in which 
Member States of the Community and Spain and Portugal does the death 
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Then in 1986 it was asked in the Council whether the EEC 
Treaty, Article 4(1) ensured that, “[a]bolition of the death pen-
alty and possible restoration of it do not fall within the Com-
munity’s competence.”37 The answer given by President 
Jacques Delors on behalf of the Commission was: 
. . . the matter in question [on the death penalty] does not come 
within [the Community’s] jurisdiction and it is therefore unable 
to supply the information requested. It can, however, inform the 
Honourable Member that Parliament has examined the matter in 
question on a number of occasions in the past. It has no doubt 
that he will be able to obtain all the necessary references to the 
information he seeks from the relevant departments of Parlia-
ment’s General Secretariat.38     
The Commission’s response demonstrated that at this time 
there was no specifically created regional body to create, ana-
lyze, and disseminate information on the death penalty. How-
ever, work was being done by the Parliament which had taken 
upon itself to be the initial petri-dish to consider the vicissi-
tudes of the punishment. In 1980 the Parliament adopted its 
first resolution calling for abolition in the EC.39 The Resolution 
on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the European Commu-
nity gave regard to the initiatives against the death penalty in 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.40  It 
stated that Mr Schwartzenberg’s question had made it “possi-
ble for Parliament to hold a debate in the future” on the pun-
ishment, and Paragraph One of the Resolution, “[a]sks that, 
pending these developments the Member States should sus-
pend all capital punishment.”41 Paragraph Two then instructed 
that this resolution be forwarded to the Council and Commis-
                                                                                                                                  
penalty still exist? In which countries is it still carried out? How is it carried 
out?”).  
37 1986 O.J. (C 249) 27. 
38 1985 O.J. (C 276) 28. 
39 Resolution on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the European 
Community, 1980 O.J. (C 327) 95.  
40 The Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 727 (1980), On the Abolition 
of Capital Punishment. This resolution set the Assembly’s early standards on 
the abolition of the death penalty; see also, Parliamentary Assembly Recom-
mendation 891 (1980) On the European Convention on Human Rights – Aboli-
tion of Capital Punishment, to the Committee of Minister’s to solidify the As-
sembly’s abolitionist standards to be communicated to the member states. See 
also PARL ASS. DEB. 32nd Sess. (Apr. 22, 1980).   
41 Resolution on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the European 
Community, supra note 39.  
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sion.42 Even though the death penalty was not being imple-
mented in the region, the Parliament was attempting to estab-
lish an official moratorium on all executions in the region until 
the status of the punishment could be determined by the re-
gion’s organs. At this time the Member States had suspended 
executions and restricted their own capital judicial systems in-
dependently of an official regional position, but the Parliament 
did not want to allow a de-centralized legal position to re-
main.43 It therefore marked the political platform for develop-
ing a more thorough consideration of the punishment at the re-
gional level. In 1981 the Parliament strengthened this initial 
abolitionist discourse with another resolution recognizing that 
the, “European Community is not simply a ‘common market,’ 
but also a common civilization.”44 It not only recalled the first 
Resolution45 and Recommendation46 on the death penalty in 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, but it al-
so considered Articles 3 and 5 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights47 and stated:  
whereas any concept of human rights consonant with the princi-
ples of European civilisation requires that the right to live be re-
spected and guaranteed for all, therefore the law must be strong 
to defend potential victims and be consistent by never ordering 
that human life be taken.48 
The preamble also noted: (i)  it was possible to execute in-
nocent people; (ii) that the punishment did not have any special 
deterrent effect; (iii) that humanitarian measures should be 
pursued; and (iv) it was the Parliament’s “hope that this initia-
                                                          
42 Id. at 96.  
43 Id.  
44 European Parliament Resolution on the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
in the European Community, 1981 O.J. (C 172). 
45 On the Abolition of Capital Punishment, supra note 40. Although the 
question of the death penalty was first raised by Astrid Bergegren in the 
Consultative Assembly in 1973, see Committee on Legal Affairs, Motion for a 
Resolution on the Abolition of Capital Punishment, May 18, 1973 (8th sitting) 
Doc. 3297. 
46 On the Abolition of Capital Punishment, supra note 40. 
47 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948)) (Art. 3, “Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person.” Art. 5, “No one shall be subject to torture, 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).    
48 European Parliament Resolution on the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
in the European Community, 1981 O.J. (C 172) 73. 
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tive will provide inspiration for all countries in the world which 
still enforce the death penalty” to abolish the punishment.49 
Paragraph One stated that the Parliament “[e]xpresses its 
strong desire that the death penalty should be abolished 
throughout the Community” and Paragraph Three identified 
that it “[h]opes, with that end in view, that a wide-ranging de-
bate on the abolition of the death penalty will take place within 
competent national bodies and in the necessary spirit of calm 
consideration.”50 In doing so, the Parliament was persistently 
pushing for a centralized enquiry with the aim of creating uni-
formity on the rejection of the punishment. What was being 
proposed was the formation of the regional position on this 
criminal justice issue. The Parliament was attempting to pro-
vide the impetus for a legal platform that Member States 
should never be justified to order that “human life be taken”51 
in the application of a death penalty. These developments re-
veal that the early 1980s can be viewed as the Member States 
providing the initial solidification of the possibility of abolition 
and the initial regional approaches to this question were on the 
whole championed by the Parliament.                  
In 1986, the Parliament set a further proactive mandate in 
adopting a resolution52 to call upon Member States to ratify 
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of 
the death penalty (hereinafter, “Protocol No. 6”).53 Protocol No. 
6 establishes the abolition of the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes for Member States of the CoE, but allows for the pun-
ishment in times of war or in the imminent threat of war.54 The 
                                                          
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 European Parliament Resolution on the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
and the Accession to the Sixth Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1986 O.J. (C 36) 214. 
53 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty, 
Apr. 28, 1983, C.E.T.S. No. 114. See Second Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition  
of the death penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. 
No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 15, 1989). 
54 Id. Protocol No. 6, (Art. 1, “The death penalty shall be abolished. No-
one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed,” Art. 2, “A State may 
make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed 
in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied on-
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resolution noted that Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal had not ratified Protocol No. 655 and 
that Ireland and the United Kingdom had not yet signed it.56 
By 1986, the only EC Member States which had ratified Proto-
col No. 6 were Denmark, Luxembourg, and Spain.57 This Par-
liament resolution not only called for the strengthening of the 
regional abolitionist position, by urging a unified rejection of 
the punishment within the EC, but it also demonstrated that 
within the sister European regions of the EC and the CoE, 
there was an emerging symbiosis of the abolitionist position.58 
A further Parliament resolution was then adopted in 1992,59 
reaffirming the call for abolition of the death penalty and urg-
ing all Member States to ratify Protocol No. 6, and also for the 
adoption of the United Nation’s mechanism for abolition, in the 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, (hereinafter, “Second Optional Protocol”), 
which abolishes the death penalty in times of peace.60 Here, the 
Parliament was urging Member States to not only ratify the 
European human rights instrument of the CoE but it was also 
seeking a regional position against the death penalty at the 
level of the United Nations. This was a visionary position that 
will come to fruition over the next two decades.  
Since 1986, the region has debated promoting abolition as 
a global initiative.61 The Parliament’s first resolution concern-
                                                                                                                                  
ly in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions. 
The State shall communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Eu-
rope the relevant provisions of that law.”). 
55 1986 O.J. (C 36) 215.  
56 Id. at 1. 
57 See infra Appendix 1.   
58 However, there were some early questions put to the restoration of the 
death penalty in Europe. See 1986 O.J. (C 249) 23. But this initiative was 
abandoned.    
59 European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty, 1992 O.J. (C 
094) 277.    
60 Second Optional Protocol, (Art. 1(1), supra note 53 (“No one within the 
jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed. (2) 
Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death pen-
alty within its jurisdiction.”). 
61 Question No. 42 by Mr. Arbeloa Muru (H-467/86) to the Foreign Minis-
ters of the Member States of the European Community meeting in Political 
Cooperation: Efforts to Abolish the Death Penalty in the World, Debates of 
the European Parliament, No. 343, at 0153; Question No. 31 by Mr. Arbeloa 
Muru (H-200/88) to the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation: 
The Death Penalty in the USA, Debates of the European Parliament, 
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ing a third country outside of the region was the 1989 condem-
nation of the application of the death penalty for political pris-
oners in Chile.62 In 1991, there was another resolution present-
ed to Brazil urging it not to reinstate the death penalty.63 In 
1994, the Parliament shifted its focus to Africa, and denounced 
the death sentences imposed in Egypt and Algeria.64 Additional 
resolutions had been passed against the extension of the death 
penalty in El Salvador,65 the Philippines,66 and Iran.67 Further 
attempts were then made to prevent the death sentence of 
Tenzin Delek Rinpoche in Tibet.68 Two resolutions were adopt-
ed condemning the death penalty practices of the United States 
in 199069 and 1992,70 and in 1995, two further resolutions were 
passed, one against the reintroduction of the death penalty in 
the State of New York,71 and the second in the specific case of 
Mumia Abu-Jamal.72 From 1995 onwards, corpuses of resolu-
tions have denounced both US state and federal government 
application of the death penalty.73  
                                                                                                                                  
91986H0467, No. 369,  at 0178. 
62 European Parliament Resolution on the Application of the Death Pen-
alty to Political Prisoners in Chile, 1989 O.J. (C 096) 139. 
63 European Parliament Resolution on the Possible Reintroduction of the 
Death Penalty in Brazil,1991 O.J. (C 183) 183. 
64 European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty in Egypt and 
Algeria, 1994 O.J. (C 020), 168. 
65 European Parliament Resolution on the Possible Extension of the 
Death Penalty in El Salvador, 1998 O.J. (C 313) 185. 
66 European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty in the Philip-
pines, 2004 O.J. (C 091 E) 691. 
67
 European Parliament Resolution on Iran, 2005 O.J. (C174 E) 190. 
68 European Parliament Resolution on Tibet, the Case of Tenzin Delek 
Rinpoche, 2005 O.J. (C 201 E) 122; European Parliament Resolution on Tibet, 
2005 O.J. (C 247 E) 158. 
69 European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty in the United 
States, 1990 O.J. (C 149) 139. 
70 European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty in the United 
States, 1992 O.J. (C 176) 124. 
71 European Parliament Resolution on the Reintroduction of the Death 
Penalty in the State of New York, 1995 O.J. (C 089) 154. 
72 European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty in the United 
States and the Abu-Jamal Case, 1995 O.J. (C 166) 131. 
73 See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty in the 
United States, 1998 O.J. (C 138) 176; European Parliament Resolution on the 
Death Penalty Passed on Rocco Derek Barnabei in the United States, 1998 
O.J. (C 328) 193; European Parliament Resolution on the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty in the United States, 2001 O.J. (C 040) 424; European Parlia-
ment Resolution on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the United States, 
2001 O.J. (C 121) 404. 
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These political statements contributed to the solidification 
of the region’s abolitionist position in the 1990s and they en-
couraged its promotion in retentionist countries around the 
world. The recent EU external policies are considered below as 
part of the operations of the European External Action Service.    
B. The EU Treaties and the Formation of Internal Abolition 
Criteria  
The EU’s Treaty provisions setting out its human rights 
policy in general and its abolitionist policy in particular, devel-
oped gradually. The Treaty of Maastricht of 199274 did not con-
tain specific abolitionist language, but stated in Article F(2) 
that:  
[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms...and as they result from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, as general 
principles of Community law. 
This was a general recognition of the regional affirmation 
and promotion of human rights within the ECHR, without a 
specific reference to the death penalty. What this demonstrated 
was that at the Treaty level, the CoE human rights framework 
was recognized and affirmed, but the particular human rights 
standards within the Articles of the ECHR were yet to be de-
termined. Under the Treaty of Maastricht, the CoE’s ECHR, 
and at this time, Protocol No. 6, with the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, provided the human rights 
benchmark. As detailed above, the “constitutional traditions” of 
the EU Member States were evolving into a hegemonic state 
rejection of the punishment, but it is clear that the regional po-
sition was not yet fully homogenous with the general position 
of the Member States. A process was being laid for the solidifi-
cation of the political will for a Treaty position against the pun-
ishment and this process was building upon the foundational 
work of the Parliament. A very positive step was then taken in 
the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam of the European Un-
ion of 199775 which included the “Declaration on the Abolition 
                                                          
74 Treaty of Maastricht, supra note 22.  
75 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 
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of the Death Penalty” that stated:  
[w]ith reference to Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union, 
the Conference recalls that Protocol No. 6 to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms . . . which has been signed and ratified by a large ma-
jority of Member States, provides for abolition of the death penal-
ty.  
In this context, the Conference notes the fact that since the sig-
nature of the abovementioned Protocol on 28 April 1983, the 
death penalty has been abolished in most of the Member States 
of the Union and has not been applied in any of them.76     
The Treaty of Amsterdam provided the first Treaty affir-
mation that the move towards abolition of the death penalty 
was included within the legal and political agenda of the EU. 
Through this Declaration the Treaty of Amsterdam endorsed 
the strengthening of the human rights discourse against the 
death penalty, and pointed towards the creation of a regional 
position, which was at this time also reflected in the majority of 
the Member States’ ratification of Protocol No. 6.77  Then, in 
2000, the Charter78 was adopted signaling a clear and specific 
EU rejection of the punishment and it was incorporated into 
the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007. Through the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties. The Treaty of 
Lisbon, Article 6 states:     
(1) The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Un-
ion…which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.  
(2) The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such 
accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in 
the Treaties.  
                                                                                                                                  
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. 
76 Id. at 125. See also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 302-09 (3d ed. 2002).  
77 Protocol No. 6, supra note 53.  
78 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 7; Protocol Relating to Ar-
ticle 6(2), supra note 8, at 155. The abolition of the death penalty can also be 
seen as being incorporated within the expansion process under the Agenda 
2000 provisions. Agenda 2000, For a Stronger and Wider Union, COM (97) 
2000 Final (July 15, 1997). For the implementation of Agenda 2000, see also 
ANDREW WILLIAMS, EU HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES: A STUDY IN IRONY, 53-74 
(2004). 
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(3) Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms and as they result from the constitutional treaties common 
to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union’s law.79 
CoE human rights have become “general principles of the 
Union’s law.” To understand how the “rights, freedoms and 
principles” are recognized and protected by the EU, it is neces-
sary to evaluate the human rights principles set out in both the 
ECHR and the Charter. Article 1 of the Charter states that 
“[h]uman Dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and pro-
tected.”80  It signals a legislative evolution with an enhanced 
human rights focus, as in 2007, Franco Frattini, former Euro-
pean Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Secu-
rity, stated “the abolition of the death penalty is an essential 
achievement for the respect for human dignity . . .” and “[i]t is 
also a basic feature of the European model. In fact, we can say 
with pride, respect for human life and dignity are basic val-
ues”.81 The EU’s Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Hu-
man Rights and Democracy of June 2012 and the EU Guide-
lines on the Death Penalty affirmed the specific evolution in 
this human rights principle, as they state that the death penal-
ty “constitutes [a] serious violation . . . of human rights and 
human dignity.”82 This provision expands the language of con-
temporary European human rights to encompass the promotion 
of dignity in punishment and the notion that the death penalty 
itself should now be considered as a violation of human digni-
ty.83      
The Charter, Article 2, “Right to Life” states that: “(1) Eve-
ryone has the right to life, and (2) No one shall be condemned 
to the death penalty, or executed.”84 Under the Charter, both 
                                                          
79 Protocol Relating to Article 6(2), supra note 8, at 13.  
80 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 7, at 9.  
81 Franco Frattini, European Commissioner responsible for Justice, 
Freedom and Security, Speech at Europe Against the Death Penalty (Oct. 9, 
2007); see also Elizabeth Wicks, The Meaning of Life: Dignity and the Right to 
Life in International Human Rights Treaties, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 2, 199-219 
(2012).      
82 EU Strategic Framework, supra note 11, at 3.   
83 For a detailed historical review of dignity in punishment in both Eu-
rope and America, see generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).  
84 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 7, at 9.  
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the “death penalty” and “executions” are prohibited.85 This in-
dicates that the whole capital judicial process is denounced 
from the possibility of a capital charge, the initiation of a capi-
tal trial, the sentence of death, placing people on death row, 
through to the final death sanctioned by the state in the execu-
tion of the inmate. Each part of any capital judicial system is a 
violation of Charter Article 2. Here the EU has mandated its 
complete rejection of the death penalty. In the sister European 
region of the CoE, the text of ECHR Article 2(1)86 establishes 
the right to life, but originally provided for a possible death 
sentence. ECHR Article 2(1) states:  
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sen-
tence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this 
penalty is provided by law.87  
Article 2(1) has not yet been specifically amended through 
textual alteration. However, Protocol 13 to the ECHR,88 Article 
1 states that “[t]he death penalty shall be abolished. No one 
shall be condemned to such penalty or executed . . .” and follow-
ing ratification of this protocol, ECHR Article 2(1) should now 
be interpreted to not provide a loop-hole for any Member States 
to apply the punishment. This legal principle can be seen as es-
tablished by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-
Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom,89 and affirmed in 
Rrapo v. Albania,90 through the court’s consideration of ECHR 
Article 2(1) and Protocol No. 13, Article 1 together.  
In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, the European Court of Human 
Rights assessed the abolition of the death penalty by CoE 
Member States, and the ratifications of Protocol No. 13 and 
held: 
[t]he right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 not to be subjected 
to the death penalty, which admits of no derogation and applies 
in all circumstances, ranks along with the rights in Articles 2 and 
                                                          
85 Id.  
86 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 8, art. 2(1). 
87 Id. 
88 Protocol No. 13, supra note 10.  
89 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 282 (2010).  
90 Rrapo v. Albania, App. No. 58555/10, ¶ 69 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012). 
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3 as a fundamental right, enshrining one of the basic values of 
the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. As 
such, its provisions must be strictly construed. . . . State practice 
in observing the moratorium on capital punishment, are strongly 
indicative that Article 2 has been amended so as to prohibit the 
death penalty in all circumstances.91 
The Court provides the interpretation that Member States’ 
signatures and ratifications of Protocol No. 13 indicate that 
there is a human rights norm created in the CoE. ECHR Arti-
cle 2(1) is now to be interpreted to not provide the facility for 
any Member State to impose the death penalty. Consequently, 
when a Member State ratifies Protocol No. 13, for that country, 
the text of the protocol supersedes the death penalty clause in 
the text of ECHR Article 2(1). Furthermore, CoE Member State 
practice in the abolition of the death penalty is a “strong indi-
cation” of a general principle of European human rights that 
Article 2(1) is now amended to nullify the clause permitting the 
death penalty.    
The court also held that Articles 2(1) and 3 are fundamen-
tal rights. Both Articles provide human rights standards from 
which to scrutinize and denounce the death penalty. The 
ECHR Article 3 has an identical provision to the Charter Arti-
cle 4, in that they state, “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”92  
The CoE has debated since 1973 whether the death penal-
ty is a per se violation of the prohibition against inhuman pun-
ishment.93 The European Court of Human Rights has evolved 
its ECHR Article 3 analysis of the capital judicial system to 
cover; (i) the capital charge and trial process,94 (ii) the circum-
stances when a death sentence is commuted to life imprison-
                                                          
91 Al-Saadoon, App. No. 61498/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 118, 120.  
92 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 7.  
93 Motion for a Resolution on the Abolition of Capital Punishment (Doc. 
3297), Committee on Legal Affairs, 8th sitting May 18, 1973. See also, un-
published report submitted to the Committee on Legal Affairs in 1975, cited 
in Parliamentary Assembly, Report on the abolition of capital punishment 
(Doc. 4509, 2), 2nd and 3rd sittings, Apr. 22, 1980; Parliamentary Assembly, 
Official Report of Debates (32nd Ordinary Session) Abolition of Capital Pun-
ishment, Debate on the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs, 2nd and 3rd 
sittings, Apr. 22, 1980. 
94 See Tarlan v. Turkey, App. No. 31096/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006); Öcalan 
v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, 985 at ¶ 169 (2003). 
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ment,95 (iii) extradition and deportation cases,96 (iv) the initia-
tion of a moratorium and the consequences of the suspension of 
executions,97 (v) the physiological and psychological impact of 
incarceration conditions,98 (vi) different methods of execution,99 
and (vii) the death row phenomenon as a jurisprudential con-
sideration of the above factors collectively.100 However, in Al-
Saadoon and Mufdhi, the court has established an evolved Ar-
ticle 3 threshold from which to consider future death penalty 
cases when it held:  
[t]he Court does not consider that the wording of the second sen-
tence of Article 2(1) continues to act as a bar to [the Court] inter-
preting the words “inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
                                                          
95 See Kotalla v. The Netherlands, App. No. 7994/77, 14 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 238 (1978); Ilaşcu and others v. Russia and Moldova, App. 
No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); Maksimov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 
38228/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, App. Nos. 9852/03 
and 13413/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).   
96 See Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 6 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. 370 (1984); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 436 
(1989); see also Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 128 
(1991); Ann Sherlock, Extradition, Death Row and the Convention, 15 EUR. L. 
REV. 87 (1990); Susan Marks, Yes, Virginia, Extradition May Breach the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 194 (1990); Bader 
and Kanbor v. Sweden, App. No. 13284/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).  
97 See Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, App. No. 38812/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); 
Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, App. No. 39042/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); Nazarenko v. 
Ukraine, App. No. 39483/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); Dankevich v. Ukraine, 
App. No. 40679/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); Aliev v. Ukraine, App. No. 41220/98, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); Khokhlich v. Ukraine, App. No. 41707/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2003); Iorgov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 40653/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); G.B. v. 
Bulgaria, App. No. 42346/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). 
98 See Poltoratskiy, App. No. 38812/97 ¶ 109-117; Kuznetsov, App. No. 
39042/97 ¶ 89-96; Nazarenko, App. No. 39483/98 ¶ 94-102; Dankevich, App. 
No. 40679/98 ¶ 94-102; Aliev, App. No. 41220/98 at 92-100; Khokhlich, App. 
No. 41707/98 ¶ 133-141. 
99 See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 141-143, (where the Commission held 
that electrocution did not “attain a level of severity contrary to Article 3”).   
100 See Kirkwood, App. No. 10479/83 at 165. (Under the heading, ‘Imple-
mentation of the Death Penalty and the “Death Row” Phenomenon,’ the Eu-
ropean Commission of Human Rights considered the fluctuation of the total 
number of people on death row in California and the time inmates waited on 
death row during their appeals up to their execution. Up to March 1983, the 
longest an inmate had to wait following appeals was a period of 5 years.  The 
Soering Court confirmed that the death row phenomenon: “may be described 
as consisting in a combination of circumstances to which the applicant would 
be exposed if, after having been extradited to Virginia to face a capital mur-
der charge, he were sentenced to death.” Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 81).      
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ment” in Article 3 as including the death penalty.101  
It now appears appropriate that along with the Court’s 
recognition that there are circumstances in which Article 2(1) 
can be viewed as amended, that it now should be interpreted 
that the death penalty is a per se violation of ECHR Article 3. 
As the text of Article 2(1) is considered amended, there is no 
“bar” to the death penalty being considered to be an inhuman 
and degrading punishment.  
In addition, as the Charter Article 2 prohibits the “death 
penalty” and “executions,” it would appear that all of these as-
pects of the capital judicial process would be considered by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union102 (as opposed to the 
many cases of complex jurisprudence of the CoE’s European 
Court of Human Rights) as a per se violation of Union law. The 
Charter appears to offer a clearer and more easily defined route 
towards abolition of the death penalty, and this is primarily be-
cause it is a more recent regional instrument on human rights. 
The ECHR was drafted in 1949-1950,103 when the European po-
litical sentiment concerning the punishment was ambivalent, 
but the Charter was adopted in 2000 within an evolved and so-
lidified European anti-death penalty discourse. The human 
rights issues that the CoE organs have had to consider, debate, 
and adjudicate, may be less felt by the organs of the EU.   
As prospective Member States must have a commitment to 
human rights, they would be required to abolish the death 
penalty as a, “pre-condition for entry into the Union.”104 This 
prerequisite for membership became the official policy follow-
ing the 2001 Commission communication to the Council and 
the Parliament, The European Union’s Role in Promoting Hu-
man Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, which 
identified that the “EU’s commitment to the abolition of the 
                                                          
101 Al-Saadoon, App. No. 61498/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 118, 120. 
102 For a discussion on the adjudication of European human rights, and 
the relationship of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, see An Interview with Judge Paul Mahoney 
by Dr Jon Yorke, BLOGSPOT (Oct. 17, 2013), http://jonyorkehuman 
rights.blogspot.co.uk/2013/10/an-interview-with-judge-paul-mahoney-by.html 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2013).  
103 See generally, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE ‘TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES’ OF 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1976). 
104 European Union, European External Action Service, EU Policy on 
Death Penalty, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/index_en.htm 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2013).  
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death penalty was reaffirmed in Article 2 of the EU Charter. It 
is a requirement for countries seeking EU membership.”105 This 
precondition for membership is also considered to be implicit 
within the abovementioned Charter and the Treaty of Lisbon.106 
No existing or future Member State can legally re-introduce 
the death penalty once it is abolished.  
III. ABOLITION AND THE EU’S EXTERNAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
POLICY  
The EU has utilized the internal abolitionist strategies to 
create, assess, and enhance bilateral and multi-lateral policies 
for its human rights external project. The European Treaties 
now provide a firm basis for the EU’s external human rights 
policy. According to Article 2 of the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
“Union is founded on the value of respect for human dignity . . . 
the rule of law and respect for human rights” and under Article 
3 the Union must uphold and promote these values in its rela-
tions with the “wider world.”107 This task is also taken up in 
Article 21(a), which states that the:  
[u]nion’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation...and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, 
the universality and indivisibility of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms.108  
On June 16 2010, Catherine Ashton, the High Representa-
                                                          
105 Commission Communication, supra note 12, at 16 (Between 1994 and 
1997, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and Committee of Min-
isters had a dialogue on the requirement of the abolition of the death penalty 
as a prerequisite of membership to the CoE region, and Resolution 1097 on 
the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, text adopted by the Parliamen-
tary Assembly (24th Sitting, Jun. 28, 1996, 6) stated, “a moratorium upon ac-
cession has become a prerequisite for membership of the Council of Europe.” 
See Yorke, The Right to Life, supra note 16, at 213-216.  
106 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 6.  
107 Treaty of Maastricht, supra note 22, at art. 3 (“In its relations with 
the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests 
and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual re-
spect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the pro-
tection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the 
strict observance and the development of international law, including respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”). 
108 Id. art. 21(a).  
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tive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,109 in 
her speech in the Parliament, declared the EU’s work on abol-
ishing the death penalty worldwide to be a “personal priori-
ty.”110  The 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy, list the fight against the death 
penalty as one of the EU’s priority human rights issues, stating 
that the death penalty constitutes “a serious violation . . . of 
human rights and human dignity. Encouraged by the growing 
momentum towards abolition of the death penalty worldwide, 
the EU will continue its long-standing campaign against the 
death penalty.”111  At the bilateral level, the EU has imple-
mented targeted strategies identified in the EU Guidelines on 
the Death Penalty,112 including bilateral diplomacy, general bi-
lateral action, and bilateral intervention in individual cases.  
A. EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty 
The framework for diplomatic EU abolitionist action, in-
cluding objectives, circumstances and instruments, are set out 
in the EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty.113  The Death Pen-
alty Guidelines were the first set of EU human rights guide-
lines.114  The guidelines, adopted at the ministerial level, are 
                                                          
109Id. According to the Treaty of Maastricht arts 18 and 27, the Union's 
common foreign and security policy is conducted by a High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security.  
110 Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Af-
fairs and Security Policy, speech during the European Parliament debate 
(June 16, 2010). (stating, “I want to see what more we can do to support the 
abolition of the death penalty worldwide. I want to assure [the European Par-
liament] that work on abolishing the death penalty is a personal priority for 
me. I will see to it that work advances, both bilaterally and in multilateral 
fora.”).  
111 EU Strategic Framework, supra note 11 (The Action Plan contained 
three specific aims for implementation of this priority: (a) Actively contribute 
to lobbying on the UNGA 67 Resolution on the death penalty moratorium, in 
order to increase support among States while developing also further the con-
tent of the initiative; (b) Undertake targeted campaigns on the death penalty 
and intensify engagement with retentionist countries, and; (c) Ensure EU in-
put to the World Congress against the Death Penalty 2013). 
112 EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, supra note 4. 
113 Id.  
114 Further EU Human Rights Guidelines cover torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; human rights dialogues 
with third countries; children and armed conflict; human rights defenders; 
promotion and protection of the rights of the child; violence against women 
and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them; as well as 
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best understood as pragmatic instruments of the EU human 
rights policy, serving as practical tools to help EU representa-
tives in the field better advance its human rights work. The EU 
Guidelines on the Death Penalty were first adopted by the 
Council of Ministers in 1998 when EU Member States decided 
to strengthen their activities in opposition to the death penal-
ty.115 In 2008 and 2013, the EU Guidelines were revised and 
updated.116 Based on today’s strong consensus among all EU 
Member States in their rejection of the death penalty, the ob-
jectives of the Union’s abolitionist work are clear-cut and have 
Member State support. The EU has opted for a pragmatic mul-
tifaceted approach and the five notable themes in the EU 
Guidelines are: (i) bilateral diplomacy, (ii) action in the multi-
lateral fora, (iii) transfer of persons in security circumstances, 
(iv) regulations on execution technologies, and (v) financial as-
sistance to the abolitionist movement.117 These are considered 
below.  
B. Bilateral Diplomacy 
The EU carries out a significant number of demarches or 
makes public statements on the death penalty towards third 
countries. The EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty state, 
“[w]here relevant, the European Union will raise the issue of 
the death penalty in its dialogues and consultations with third 
countries.”118 The elements in these contacts will include, the 
EU’s call for universal abolition of the death penalty, or if the 
country maintains the punishment, then a call for a moratori-
um will be made.119 Where a country imposes the punishment, 
the EU will emphasize that states should only use the death 
penalty in line with the provisions contained in the EU Mini-
mum Standards.120 These Minimum Standards are based on 
                                                                                                                                  
international Humanitarian Law.  New EU Human Rights Guidelines on the 
freedom of religion or belief and on LGBTI are expected to be adopted later in 
2013. See Human Rights Guidelines, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/guidelines/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 
7, 2013).  
115 EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, supra note 4. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 1-7. 
118 Id. at 4.  
119 Id. at 6. 
120 Id. 
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the abolitionist provisions contained in international human 
rights law and other international standards, including the 
maintenance of maximum transparency, through publishing 
information about the death penalty and its use.121 
The Minimum Standards122 spelt out in the EU Death 
                                                          
121 Id. at 1-7. 
122 EU Guidelines On Death Penalty, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, (Apr. 
12, 2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/guidelines/death_penalty/docs/ 
guidelines_death_penalty_st08416_en.pdf. The Minimum Standards in the 
EU Death Penalty Guidelines states:  
While continuing to state its strong opposition to the death penalty and 
advocate for its full abolition, the EU shall insist that those countries 
that still maintain executions respect the following minimum stand-
ards: 
i) The death penalty must not be imposed for non-violent acts such as 
financial or economic crimes, or because of political offences or rivalries. 
It shall also not be imposed for drug related crimes, religious practices 
or expression of conscience, or for sexual relations between consenting 
adults, it also being understood that scope should never go beyond the 
most serious intentional crimes. 
ii) Capital punishment must never be provided for in law as a mandato-
ry sentence. 
iii) Capital punishment shall not be imposed for a crime for which the 
death penalty was not prescribed at the time of its commission, it being 
understood that if, subsequent to the commission of the crime, provision 
is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall 
benefit thereby. 
iv) Capital punishment shall not be imposed on: 
Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of their 
crime; 
Pregnant women, new mothers and nursing women; 
Persons suffering from any mental illness or having an intellectual dis-
ability 
The elderly. 
v) Capital punishment shall not be imposed if the guilt of the person 
charged is not based upon clear and convincing evidence, leaving room 
for alternative explanation of the facts. In this respect, the use of tor-
ture to extract guilty pleas shall be strictly prohibited. 
vi) A final judgement rendered by an independent and impartial compe-
tent court after legal proceedings, including those before special tribu-
nals or jurisdictions, which gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair 
trial, at least equal to those contained in Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right of anyone 
suspected of or charged with a crime for which capital punishment may 
be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings 
shall be necessary. 
vii) When considering whether legal proceedings provide all possible 
safeguards to ensure a fair trial, due attention shall be given to wheth-
er anyone suspected of or charged with a crime for which capital pun-
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Penalty Guidelines reflect and, in parts, go beyond the thresh-
olds established in the UN context. In international law, for 
example, those standards concerning capital trials and the ap-
plication of executions, notably in Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),123 Article 37 
                                                                                                                                  
ishment may be imposed has been informed of the right to contact a 
consular representative. 
viii) Military tribunals may not impose death sentences on civilians un-
der any circumstances. 
ix) Anyone sentenced to death shall have an effective right to appeal to 
a court of higher jurisdiction. 
x) Where applicable, anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to 
submit an Individual complaint under international or regional proce-
dures; the death sentence will not be carried out while the complaint 
remains under consideration under those procedures; the death penalty 
will not be carried out as long as any related legal or formal procedure, 
at the international, regional or national level, is pending. 
xi) Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or 
commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the 
sentence of death may be granted in all cases of capital punishment; 
the death sentence will not be carried out while such applications re-
main under consideration under relevant procedures in a state. 
xii) Capital punishment may not be carried out in contravention of a 
state's international commitments. 
xiii) Consideration shall be given to the length of time spent on death 
row and the conditions of imprisonment after having been sentenced to 
death, bearing in mind that the conditions of imprisonment of persons 
on death row should not be inferior to that of other inmates. These ele-
ments may constitute forms of torture or inhumane or degrading 
treatment or punishment 
xiv) Where capital punishment occurs notwithstanding the EU's best ef-
forts to prevent it, it shall only be carried out so as to inflict the mini-
mum possible suffering. It may not be carried out in public or in any 
other manner intended to further degrade the person facing execution. 
Equally, it must not be practised in secrecy. The family and lawyers of 
prisoners on death row must be notified of details of their execution. 
xv) The death penalty must not be applied or used in a discriminatory 
manner on any ground including political affiliation, sex, racial or eth-
nic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
123 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 
1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. (“Every 
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of this life. (2) In countries which 
have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only 
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of 
the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant…This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment 
rendered by a competent court.”).  For a comprehensive review of ICCPR Art. 
6, see HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 27.  
28 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  4-1 
(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,124 and the UN 
Economic and Social Council Safeguards Guaranteeing Protec-
tion of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty.125  
The EU understands the Minimum Standards as a mecha-
nism for restricting, but not promoting, any residual efficacy of 
the capital judicial process. They are read in line with ICCPR 
Article 6(6) which states that “[n]othing in this article shall be 
invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punish-
ment.”126 Hence, a retentionist state cannot claim to follow the 
Minimum Standards in a continued effort to ameliorate the in-
herent deficiencies of the capital judicial process. This is be-
cause the EU does not hold the position that an improvement 
in the Minimum Standards of a state’s capital judicial system 
can lead it to being in full compliance with the human rights 
standards set out in the Charter.127 This is because the death 
penalty is fundamentally prohibited.  
The Guidelines state that when the EU approaches reten-
tionist countries it takes into consideration, inter alia: (i) 
whether the country has an independent and efficient judicial 
system guaranteeing a fair trial to any accused person; (ii) 
whether the country has made international undertakings not 
to use the death penalty; (iii) whether the legal system of the 
country, and its use of the death penalty, is closed to public and 
international scrutiny, and; (iv) whether there are indications 
that the death penalty is widely used in contravention of the 
                                                          
124 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 (“No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life im-
prisonment shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below 18 
years of age.”).  
125 Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the 
Death Penalty E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1984/50; Additions to 
the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the 
Death Penalty E.S.C. Res. 1989/64, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1989/64; Strengthening 
of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the 
Death Penalty E.S.C. Res. 1996/15, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1996/15. For a review of 
the application of the Safeguards around the world, see E.S.C. Res. 2010/10, 
U.N. Doc. E/RES/2010/10 (Capital punishment and implementation of the 
safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death 
penalty).  
126 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 
123.  
127 The Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 7.  
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Minimum Standards.128 These interventions can concern the 
general policy of a third country with regard to the death pen-
alty or focus specifically on individuals currently under threat 
of being sentenced to death or executed. These are dealt with in 
general bilateral action and in specific individual cases.    
i. General Bilateral Action 
The EU raises the issue of the death penalty with third 
countries in various forms. In addition to the focus on human 
rights, the EU supports the position that miscarriages of jus-
tice, which are inevitable in any legal system, are irreversi-
ble.129 In the context of its numerous human rights dialogues 
and consultations with third countries,130 these apply to States 
that are sometimes referred to as “like-minded,” such as (on the 
whole) the United States and Japan.131 Prominent EU tools are 
demarches and statements at times when a third country’s 
death penalty policy is in flux, both to welcome positive devel-
opments (e.g., abolition) or to comment on negative ones (e.g., a 
death sentence and/or administration of an execution).132 The 
communications also encourage transparency in a retentionist 
state’s capital judicial system when the death penalty is 
                                                          
128 EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 2.  
129 See, e.g., E.U. Open Letter to Illinois Governor Pat Quinn Urging Illi-
nois Death Penalty Abolition Legislation Passage, (Jan. 14, 2011), available 
at http://www.eurunion.org/eu/images/stories/ilgovquinn-dpabol-1-14-11.jpg 
(last visited Oct 7, 2013).   
130 Human rights dialogues are one of the tools that the EU uses to im-
plement its human rights policy and are established in accordance with the 
EU Guidelines on Human Rights dialogues.  EU Guidelines on Human Rights 
Dialogues with Third Countries, EUR. EXT. ACTION SERV, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/guidelines/dialogues/docs/16526_08_en.p
df. (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). The EU has established over 40 dialogues fo-
cused on human rights.   
131 See, e.g., The Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations 1990, 
available at   http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declaration _90_en.pdf; see 
generally the “United States” page on the European External Action Service 
website, http://eeas.europa.eu/us/  (last visited, Oct. 10, 2013); see also Speech 
by EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso, “EU-Japan: A Mature 
Relationship with Untapped Potential, TOKYO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Apr. 
21 2006),  http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5918_en.htm.  
132 See, e.g., Press Release, European Union, EU High Representative 
Catherine Ashton, Declaration on Behalf of the EU on the Moratorium on the 
Death Penalty in Mongolia (Jan. 14, 2010), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-10-3_en.htm?locale=en.  
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used.133 Under its so-called “countries on the cusp” campaign, 
the EU has carried out periodic demarche initiatives in coun-
tries on the verge of abolishing or reintroducing the death pen-
alty.134 In addition, the EU encourages third countries to ratify 
the relevant international UN and other instruments, such as 
the Second Optional Protocol.135 
General demarches are carried out and statements are is-
sued by the EU to cover a large variety of circumstances. For 
instance, in the second half of 2012, statements covered differ-
ent issues from the criminalization of homosexuality in Came-
roon,136 the decision of Thailand to abolish the death penalty 
for juvenile offenders,137 the refused access of EU diplomatic 
representatives to the Supreme Court of Gambia in a death 
penalty case,138 and the condemnation of recent executions in 
Iran.139 Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for Foreign 
                                                          
133 This is achieved through authoring and publishing demarches, which 
highlight and evaluate individual country’s capital charges, sentences, death 
row conditions and executions. See generally, EU Policy on the Death Penal-
ty, http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 
10, 2013).  
134 See, e.g., Press Release, European Union, Declaration by the High 
Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the re-
introduction of the death penalty in Papua New Guinea, Brussels, (June 3, 
2013), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/ 
pressdata/en/cfsp/137377.pdf.  
135 See, e.g., Press Release, European Union, EU High Representative 
Catherine Ashton, Declaration on Behalf of the EU on the Parliamentary and 
Presidential Approval of the Kyrgyz law on accession to the Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR on the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Mar. 17, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/1134
17.pdf. 
136 Press Release, European Union, EU Spokesperson of High Repre-
sentative Catherine Ashton, Statement on the Criminalisation of Homosexu-
ality in Cameroon (Dec. 20, 2012), available at 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134576.
pdf.   
137 Press Release, European Union, EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton, The Decision of Thailand to Abolish the Death Penalty for Juvenile 
Offenders (Sept. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/13
2302.pdf.  
138 Press Release, Local EU Statement, EU diplomatic representatives 
refused access to the Supreme Court (Oct. 19, 2012), available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/gambia/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20
121019_en.htm. 
139 Press Release, European Union, Statement by EU High Representa-
tive Catherine Ashton on ten recent executions in Iran (Oct. 23, 2012), avail-
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Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU, also provides 
statements when countries sign up to the international in-
struments abolishing the death penalty.140 For example, on be-
half of the EU on Benin’s accession to the Second Optional Pro-
tocol,141 and on behalf of the EU on the abolition of the death 
penalty in the U.S. State of Connecticut.142 The EU also issues 
statements on the occasion of the World/European Day against 
the Death Penalty on October 10th, not only on behalf of the 
EU,143 but also together with the CoE.144  
The statements made by the High Representative or her 
spokesperson,145 are complemented by statements of members 
of the European Parliament. By way of example, in 2011 there 
was a debate on the EU-Libya Framework Agreement where 
Ana Gomes stated “[t]he Union cannot abstain from persuading 
Libya to commit itself to a moratorium on the death penalty 
and it is essential that it demands that the Libyan authorities 
publish the identity of national and foreign citizens who are 
                                                                                                                                  
able at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata 
/EN/foraff/133152.pdf.  
140 Press Release, European Union, Statement by the Spokesperson of 
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on Bolivia’s accession to the Sec-
ond Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (July 17, 2013), available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/ 
EN/foraff/138105.pdf.  
141 Press Release, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, Declara-
tion on Behalf of the European Union on Benin's Accession to the Second Op-
tional Protocol to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (July 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/1
31711.pdf. 
142Press Release, European Union, EU High Representative, Declaration 
on Behalf of the European Union on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the 
US State of Connecticut (Jan. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/129830.pdf. 
143 See, e.g., Press Release, European Union, European and World Day 
Against the Death Penalty – EU Underlines Commitment to Universal Aboli-
tion (Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132781.pdf. 
144 See, e.g., Press Release, European Union, Thorbjørn Jagland, Secre-
tary General of the Council of Europe and Catherine Ashton, European Un-
ion High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Decla-
ration on the European and World Day against the Death Penalty (Oct. 10, 
2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/ 
pressdata/EN/foraff/132777.pdf.  
145 There is also the possibility of local EU statements.  
32 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  4-1 
executed.”146 The 2012 Parliament resolution on Pakistan 
commended the efforts of Shahbaz Bhatti, the Minister for Mi-
norities, for the introduction of a bill seeking the abolition of 
the death penalty for the crime of blasphemy.147 These 
strengthened the call for the ceasing of the death penalty for 
juveniles in the Yemen,148 the call for a moratorium on the 
death penalty in Bahrain,149 the denunciation of the 146 secret 
executions in Iran, and the calling for a moratorium150 and for 
an end to the mandatory death penalty in Pakistan.151 In the 
first half of 2012, the Parliament adopted resolutions to call for 
the initiation of a moratorium as a step to abolition of the 
death penalty in Belarus,152 it urged the Japan Minister of Jus-
tice, Toshio Ogawa, not to approve execution orders,153 and re-
peated its call for Nigeria to abolish the death penalty.154     
The EU equally pursues its abolitionist agenda in its con-
tacts with the anti-death penalty community and works on fos-
tering public debate about the death penalty in retentionist 
                                                          
146 Remarks of Ana Gomes, Debate: EU-Libya Framework Agreement, 
CRE 19/01/2011, EUR. PARL. DEB. (Jan. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=201101
19&secondRef=ITEM-013&language=EN. 
147 Resolution of 20 January 2011 on Pakistan, in Particular the Murder 
of Governor Salmaan Taseer, 2012 O.J. (C 136 E/16).  
148 Resolution on the Yemen, Persecution of Juvenile Offenders, in Par-
ticular the Case of Muhammed Taher Thabet Samoum. 2012 O.J. (C 188 
E/13).   
149 Resolution, Bahrain, 2012 O.J. (C 48 E/238). 
150 Resolution on Iran – Recent Cases of Human Rights Violations, 
P7_TA(2011)0517, EUR. PARL. DOC. (Nov. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P7
-RC-2011-0594&language=EN. 
151 Resolution on the Situation of women in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
P7_TA(2011)0591, EUR. PARL. DOC. (Dec. 15, 2011), available at, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+ 
MOTION+P7-RC-2011-0702+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.  
152 Resolution of 16 February 2012 the death penalty in Belarus, in par-
ticular the cases of Dzmitry Kanavalau and Uladzislau Kavalyou, 2012 O.J. 
(C 286 E/22). 
153 Resolution on the death penalty in Japan, P7_TA(2012)0065, EUR. 
PARL. DOC. (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides 
/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B7-2012-
0091+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en. 
154 Resolution on the Situation in Nigeria, P7_TA(2013)0335, EUR. PARL. 
DOC. (July 4, 2013), available at, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get 
Doc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2013-0350&language=EN.  
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countries, e.g., by organizing public seminars.155 One example 
of such activity was the Death Penalty Symposium, “Reflec-
tions on Life: European and Asian Perspectives on Capital 
Punishment,” which was organized by the EU in co-operation 
with Waseda University on December 2, 2009 in Tokyo.156 Dur-
ing the event, a range of speakers including State Minister 
Kamei, offered Japanese, Asian, and European views on the 
death penalty and its abolition. Speeches included historical 
and legal aspects, as well as a discussion of values and the role 
of the media with regard to the abolition of capital punish-
ment.157 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle have noted the in-
creased abolitionist focus and the development of anti-death 
penalty strategies, within the Asia region.158 Roger Hood has 
authored a report for the European Parliament’s Directorate-
General for External Policies, titled Enhancing EU Action on 
the Death Penalty in Asia, and provided a detailed strategy for 
the region to adopt in its bilateral and multilateral action in 
Asian countries.159 Hood recommended that an individualized 
approach to different Asian countries be initiated, as “no single 
strategy should have priority, rather each country should be 
approached in regard to the stage that it has reached in consid-
ering whether to continue to retain or to move towards further 
restriction or complete abolition of the death penalty.”160 This 
advice to the EU institutions, particularly the Commission, 
                                                          
155 See, e.g., Public event to promote the abolition of the death penalty in 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur  Convention Centre, Kuala Lumpur, October 13, 
2011, see, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/malaysia/documents/ 
press_corner/all_news/2011/20111013_en.pdf. 
156 Reflections on Life: European and Asian Perspectives on Capital Pun-
ishment, EUIJ, WASEDA UNIV., TOKYO, December 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.euij-waseda.jp/eng/outreach/reflections-on-life-european-and-
asian-perspectives-on-capital-punishment.html.  
157 Id. 
158 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 27, at 84-103.  
159 European Parliament, Enhancing EU Action on the Death Penalty in 
Asia, EUR  PARL. DOC. EXPO/B/DROI/2011/22, (October 17, 2012).  
160 Id. at 8; See also DAVID T. JOHNSON & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE NEXT 
FRONTIER: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN ASIA 333 (2009) (In their scholarly study, Zimring and Johnson 
note the regions’ policy developments when they state: “The Europeans’ suc-
cess on their home turf has left death penalty activists with energy and re-
sources for other geographic zones. If the death penalty issues continue to 
command the interest that was evident at the turn of the 21st century, then 
more of the missionary vigor of European activists will get directed to coun-
tries in Asia.”). 
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Parliament, and the specific role of the EEAS, will prove ex-
tremely valuable for the EU dialogue with Asian countries on 
the issue of capital punishment. 
ii. Individual Cases 
When a retentionist country continues to apply the death 
penalty, the EU has argued that it must observe the funda-
mental legal tenets of due process and the rule of law.161 The 
EU Death Penalty Guidelines task the EU to consider making 
a specific demarche, where it becomes aware of individual 
death penalty cases that violate EU Minimum Standards. Con-
sequently, the EU does not intervene in every individual death 
penalty case in the world.162 Rather, the EU considers litigation 
on a case-by-case basis.163 The reason for this is not so much 
the obvious practical impossibility to collect sufficient infor-
mation on every capital case, but primarily the intent to main-
tain a strategic approach. Each case is considered individually 
and if an EU intervention would be expected to be counter-
productive in a given case, it would refrain from taking ac-
tion.164  
Once the decision has been taken that the EU should in-
tervene, appropriate action is determined – again on a case-by-
case basis.165 The criterion is to identify what appears to be the 
most effective way of preventing a death sentence or the execu-
tion of the individual.166 Speed is often of the essence. Possible 
actions include public statements or declarations, as well as 
confidential intervention (in particular, demarches).167 On this 
basis, in the second semester of 2012, the EU sent a number of 
demarches. While most demarches were of a confidential na-
ture, some interventions on behalf of individuals are public.  In 
2011-12, examples of individual cases around the world includ-
ed, the execution of Troy Davis in Georgia, U.S.A. on Septem-
                                                          
161 EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, supra note 4, at 1.   
162 Id. (“The European Union will consider, case by case, and on the basis 
of relevant criteria, whether to make demarches to other countries over the 
use of the death penalty.” Id. at 3).   
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 3-4.   
167 Id. at 3.    
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ber 22, 2011,168 and the execution in Japan of Yukinori Matsu-
da and Sachiko Eto on September 27, 2012.169 Publicly availa-
ble interventions occurred in America, where the EU has inter-
vened in recent years in the following cases: Tennessee v. 
Stephen West, Virginia v. Teresa Lewis, California v. Albert 
Greenwood Brown, Ohio v. Kevin Keith and Washington State 
v. Cal Coburn Brown.170  
IV. AMICUS CURIAE 
The EU also submits amicus curiae briefs in capital cases 
at first instance and in capital appeals, in particular in Ameri-
ca.171  The amicus curiae brief provides an extra source of in-
formation, which presents to the court the interests of global 
organizations and citizens.172 As amici, the EU is contributing 
to the human rights discourse, which can then be used to in-
form the jurisprudence of American state and federal courts. 
Since 1998, there has been an increase in EU amicus curiae 
briefs.173 The fact that the EU files a brief in a case reveals to 
the American courts that the people of Europe are interested in 
                                                          
168 Press Release, European Union, Statement by High Representative 
Catherine Ashton on the execution of Troy Davis (Sept. 22, 2011), available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/for 
aff/124707.pdf.  
169 Press Release, European Union, Statement by EU High Representa-
tive Catherine Ashton on the recent executions in Japan. (Sept. 28, 2012), 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/ 
EN/foraff/136952.pdf.   
170 See Death Penalty Archive 2010, DELEGATION OF THE EUR. UNION TO 
THE US, available at http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-do/policy-
areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-and-capital-punishment/death-
penalty/death-penalty-archive-2010/. Letters to the respective Governors are 
available at the website of the EU Delegation in Washington D.C. 
171 Amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs are filed by (amici) persons 
or groups who are not parties to the proceedings that the court is considering. 
The amici need to demonstrate that they have a legitimate interest in one or 
more of the legal questions before the court. See JULIAN KILLINGLEY, 
EXECUTION OF JUVENILES AND MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: REPORT OF AMICUS TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH 
OFFICE (2005) (on file with the author). 
172 See generally Joseph T. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence 
of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000). 
173 See generally, for EU action in US death penalty cases (including fil-
ing amicus curiae briefs), Delegation of the European Union to the United 
States, THE DEATH PENALTY ARCHIVE, http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-
do/policy-areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-and-capital-
punishment/death-penalty/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).  
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this litigation. It is evident that US death penalty scholars are 
also interested in analyzing how the world picture can be used 
to inform the death penalty as applied in America.174 The lead-
ing web resources on capital punishment in the United States 
include the Washington, DC based Death Penalty Information 
Center, which has a detailed section on international perspec-
tives and the United States’ use and rejection of international 
law.175 On the Death Penalty Worldwide website, Professor 
Sandra Babcock of the Center for International Human Rights 
at Northwestern Law School’s Bluhm Legal Clinic, provides a 
comprehensive database of retentionist countries’ capital laws 
and cogent international materials.176 Both of these web re-
sources on the death penalty provide key information not just 
for capital defense in the United States, but also for dissemi-
nating information for the defense of people who face capital 
charges or who are now on death row, around the world. What 
these and other resources demonstrate is that there is a strong 
community of American scholars who consider the bilateral and 
multilateral perspectives relevant for the consideration of the 
death penalty at the domestic level. In essence, the application 
and rejection of the death penalty should take place within a 
global dialogue. Transparency of state practice allows a multi-
faceted analysis, through both domestic and international 
means, to determine the legitimacy of state punishment.       
The EU amicus curiae brief facilitates this international 
consideration and legal dialogue on the punishment. Indeed, 
the EU argues that it has an identifiable “interest” in filing 
                                                          
174 See, e.g., RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 1025-1096 (4th ed. 2012) (which is a leading resource 
book on the capital judicial system of the United States. It includes a sub-
stantial section on international issues detailing both municipal and regional 
court and policy considerations); FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF 
AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1-42 (2003); AUSTIN SARAT & JÜRGEN 
MARTSCHUKAT, IS THE DEATH PENALTY DYING? EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVES (2011); AUSTIN SARAT & CHRISTIAN BOULANGER, THE CULTURAL 
LIVES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2005); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: 
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND 
EUROPE (2003). 
175 See generally The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, THE 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-
international-perspective (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).   
176 See generally Death Penalty Worldwide, NORTHWESTERN LAW CTR. FOR 
INT’L RIGHTS, http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/about.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2013).   
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amicus curiae briefs. The EU brief in Roper v. Simmons stated 
the interest as: 
The EU and its Member States, as members of the international 
community, have a strong interest in providing information to 
this Court on international human rights norms in a case in 
which those norms may be relevant.177 
In 2001, the EU submitted an amicus curiae brief in sup-
port of certiorari in the case of McCarver v. North Carolina.178 
It concerned the impending execution of a mentally retarded 
inmate,179 but the U.S. Supreme Court held that certiorari had 
been improvidently granted as North Carolina introduced a 
mental retardation statute preventing the death penalty for 
inmates with the mental health condition.180 However, another 
case concerning a mentally retarded inmate was submitted to 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002. In Atkins v. Virginia, Justice 
Stevens referred to the EU brief filed in McCarver, when he 
gave judgment on the constitutionality of executing Daryl At-
kins who suffered from mild mental retardation.181 In holding 
that the death penalty for inmates suffering from this mental 
health condition was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, Justice Stevens stated 
in an observation in footnote 21, that, “within the world com-
munity, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes commit-
ted by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disap-
proved.”182 
                                                          
177 Brief of Richard J. Wilson, Counsel for The European Union and 
Members of the International Community as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) at 1. 
178 McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001); see also, Brief of 
Richard J. Wilson, Brief of Amicus Curiae, the European Union, Ernest Paul 
McCarver, v. State of North Carolina, No. 00-8727, available at 
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/emccarver.pdf.  
179 See generally AMERICAN ASSOC. ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEV. 
DISABILITIES, http://www.aaidd.org (last visited July 10, 2013) (The mental 
health diagnosis “mental retardation” is termed as “learning difficulties” in 
the United Kingdom. The United States term “mental retardation” has now 
been replaced with, “intellectual disabilities.”).  
180 McCarver, 533 U.S. 975.  
181 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 (2002).  
182 Id. at  316 n.21 (citing Brief of Richard J. Wilson for the European 
Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina 
533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), available at 
www.internationaljusticeproject.org/ pdfs/emccarver.pdf. 
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During the Atkins oral argument,183 in the U.S. Supreme 
Court on Wednesday, February 20, 2002, there was a dialogue 
between counsel for the Respondent, Pamela A. Rumpz, and 
various Justices of the Supreme Court. It concerned the ques-
tion of the relevance and applicability of international opinion 
for the Court’s determination of whether executing people suf-
fering from mental retardation violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.184 Justice Ginsburg asked:  
Ms. Rumpz, in making this cruel and unusual decision . . . this is 
an issue that’s come up before, but does what the rest of the 
world think about executing the mentally retarded . . . should 
that have any relevance at all? I mean, we have, since the time 
we said we don’t look to the rest of the world, been supporters of 
international human rights tribunals in . . . the former Yugosla-
via, for the former Rwanda. But is it still, would you say, just ir-
relevant that most of the rest of the world thinks . . . it’s inhuman 
to execute them?185  
Ms. Rumpz responded:  
This Court has said previously that the notions of other countries 
and the notions of other lands cannot play the deciding factor in 
what-186 
Justice Ginsburg continued:  
Not deciding.  I asked you if it was relevant.187  
Ms. Rumpz’s answer was that it is relevant to:   
determine whether our practice is a historical accident or not. 
But it certainly is not relevant in deciding the Eighth Amend-
ment.188   
The use of the EU brief in the opinion of the Supreme 
Court by Justice Stevens demonstrated that he, Justice Gins-
burg, and the majority opinion Justices189 thought that the 
                                                          
183 Oral Argument, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (No. 00-8452), avail-
able at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_8452.  
184 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.   
185 Oral Argument at 53:54, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (No. 00-
8452).  
186 Id. at 54:40. 
187 Id. at 54:52. 
188 Id. at 54:56.   
189 Id. (Atkins v. Virginia was a 6-3 decision. The Justices in the majority 
were Stevens, J. O’Connor, J. Kennedy, J. Souter, J. Ginsburg, J. and Breyer 
J. The Justices in the minority were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Scalia J. 
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views of the EU were relevant for the determination of whether 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from executing people 
with mental retardation. The Supreme Court was concerned to 
demonstrate that in order to determine the constitutionality of 
punishment within the United States, it would involve a com-
ponent, or is part of, the international dialogue focused upon 
what is considered legitimate state treatment of individuals.190 
This is also confirmed by a corpus of previous jurisprudence af-
firming the Supreme Court’s analysis of international opinion 
and law, for its own constitutional adjudication.191  
The use of the views of the “world community” was severe-
ly criticized by both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia 
in their dissenting opinions. Both of the Justices argued that 
the sovereignty of the United States should have overridden 
the reliance on the EU brief. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated 
that he needed to “call attention to the defects in the Court’s 
decision to place weight on foreign laws,”192 that he did not see 
“how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of 
their citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate de-
termination,”193 and that “if it is evidence of a national consen-
sus for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other 
countries simply are not relevant.”194  
In line with this reasoning, Justice Scalia stated that “the 
Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national 
consensus’ must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a 
footnote) to the views of . . . members of the so-called “world 
community. . . .”195 Then he cited his own dictum in the previ-
ous Supreme Court case of Thompson v. Oklahoma, and stated:       
We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United 
States of America that we are expounding . . . .  [W]here there is 
not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of 
                                                                                                                                  
and Thomas J.)  
190 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
191 See, e.g., Murray v. Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64 (1804); Trop v. Dul-
les 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).   
192 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322.  
193 Id. at 324-25. 
194 Id. at 325. 
195 Id. at 347 (letters capitalized in original). 
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other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court 
may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans 
through the Constitution.196 
This is a central issue in constitutional adjudication. It is 
clear that the death penalty has become internationalized, and 
so the question is to what extent the U.S. Supreme Court can 
maintain an isolated and confined consideration of the legal 
controversy surrounding the punishment. In line with this ju-
risprudential issue a recent edited collection, Is the Death Pen-
alty Dying? European and American Perspectives by death pen-
alty scholars, Austin Sarat (from America) and Jürgen 
Martschukat (from Germany), reviewed the benefit of consider-
ing European principles.197 In the introduction, Sarat and 
Martschukat stated:  
[The collection focuses on] what can be learned about the Ameri-
can death penalty and the prospects of its abolition by studying 
the European experience with capital punishment and especially 
the multifaceted trajectory of abolition in different European na-
tions and the European Union . . . [t]his work shows how the 
death penalty has helped define the political and cultural identi-
ties of both Europe and the United States and will help readers 
understand the cultural and institutional barriers that stand in 
the way of abolition of the death penalty in America.198 
There is a growing perception that there are irredeemable 
constitutional deficiencies of the capital judicial system in the 
United States. Sarat and Martschukat note, “[w]ith increasing 
intensity, capital punishment in America has been labelled a 
broken system.”199 In Justice Blackmun’s dissent against the 
denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, he argued:    
It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of pro-
cedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death 
penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic 
question – does the system accurately and consistently determine 
which defendants “deserve” to die? – cannot be answered in the 
affirmative.200         
                                                          
196 Id. at 348 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 (1989). 
Scalia, J., dissenting).   
197 Sarat and Martschukat, supra note 22.  
198 Id. at 1.  
199 Id. at 2.  
200 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).  
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Furthermore, Justice Stevens, in Baze v. Rees, confirmed 
this damning observation when he claimed:  
The current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress of 
the United States, and by this Court to retain the death penalty 
as a part of our law are the product of habit and inattention ra-
ther than an acceptable deliberative process that weighs the cost 
and risks of administering that penalty against its identifiable 
benefits.201       
Hence it appears most appropriate, as the United States is 
a very important member of the global community, for the 
country to assess its capital judicial system, not just through 
the lens of its own federal and state law, but also to continually 
review the international developments on the punishment. The 
EU amicus curiae brief provides an international perspective 
from which those within the United States capital judicial sys-
tem can use to reflect upon whether the state and federal prac-
tices are indeed “broken,” and merely the “product of habit and 
inattention.”202 With respect to punishment of criminals with 
mental health problems, the EU brief helps provide further re-
sources for an assessment of whether the recognized “habit” 
and “inattention” is not applied to this vulnerable group of peo-
ple in American society. These global perspectives on mental 
health assessment, diagnosis and prognosis, provides a greater 
opportunity for the judiciary to make the most informed deci-
sions when determining sentences.  
The next significant case where an EU amicus curiae brief 
provided extra information for sentencing guidelines was in 
Roper v. Simmons.203 The Court considered the punishment of 
juvenile offenders who faced the death penalty.204 In this case, 
the EU abolitionist position was discussed between Mr. James 
R. Layton, attorney for the Petitioner, and various Justices. 
Justice Kennedy, who is a renowned expert on international 
law, began the dialogue on comparative law and policy, and 
                                                          
201 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 93 (2008); id. at 78 (Justice Stevens then 
cited Gregg v. Georgia and stated “we explained that unless a criminal sanc-
tion serves a legitimate penological function, it constitutes a ‘gratuitous in-
fliction of suffering’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Thomp-
son v. McNeil, 129 S.Ct. 1299, 1300-01 (2009).   
202 Id. 
203 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). See also, Brief of Richard J. 
Wilson, supra note 136.  
204 Simmons, 543 U.S. 551. 
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said:  
Let’s focus on the word unusual. Forget cruel for the moment, 
although they’re both obviously involved.  We’ve seen very sub-
stantial demonstration that world opinion is . . . against this, at 
least as interpreted by the leaders of the European Union.  Does 
that have a bearing on what's unusual?  Suppose it were shown 
that the United States were one of the very, very few countries 
that executed juveniles, and that’s true.  Does that have a bear-
ing on whether or not it’s unusual?205   
Mr. Layton answered: 
No more than if we were one of the very few countries that didn’t 
do this.  It would bear on the question of unusual.  The decision 
as to the Eighth Amendment should not be based on what hap-
pens in the rest of the world.  It needs to be based on the mores of 
. . . American society.206  
Here, Justice Kennedy provides a cogent interpretation of 
the EU abolitionist position and asks Mr. Layton whether this 
regional perspective of how juvenile offenders should be treated 
by sovereign states has a “bearing” on the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the Eighth Amendment.207 According to Mr. 
Layton, the issue remained one to be dealt with in isolation 
from the rest of the world, as an expression of the sovereign 
state privilege to determine criminal sanctions within a territo-
ry. This was revealed in Mr. Layton’s opinion through what he 
termed the “mores . . . of American society.”208 The social and 
political “mores” that have contributed to the maintenance of 
the death penalty in America have received much academic 
scrutiny.209  
Theories on the historiography of American punishment 
and the death penalty, have led to the domestic application be-
ing compared to the abolitionist movement in Europe. Carol 
                                                          
205 Id. Oral Argument at 11:53, Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (No. 03-
633), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_633.  
206 Id. at 12:31. 
207 Id.  
208 Id.  
209 For example see the debate in the journal Punishment and Society, 
David Garland, Capital Punishment and American Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT & 
SOCIETY 4, 347-376 (2005); Franklin E. Zimring, Path Dependence Culture 
and State Level Execution Policy, A Reply to David Garland, 7 PUNISHMENT & 
SOCIETY 4, 377-384 (2005); James Q Whitman, Response to Garland, 7 
PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 4, 389-396.       
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Steiker highlighted the issue of the contemporary practice of 
American use of the death penalty. She argued that in the use 
of this punishment, “America is ‘exceptional’ compared to Eu-
rope and other Westernized countries in the world.”210 Hadar 
Aviram and Ryan Newby agree that:  
The death penalty is generally considered a stark example 
of American exceptionalism in matters of punishment and cor-
rections. Long after most European countries had abolished 
capital punishment, death sentences and capital post-
conviction litigation are still features of the American legal 
system.”211  
A clear distinction has emerged between the most severe 
punishment imposed upon the worst offenders in Europe and 
the punishment that is applied in such circumstances in the re-
tentionist states of the United States.212 Explicitly, the “worst 
of the worst” offenders in Europe do not receive the death pen-
alty and the “worst of the worst” offenders in the death penalty 
retentionist states in the United States can receive the death 
penalty.213   
                                                          
210 Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 
81 OR. L. REV. 97-130 (2002) (discussing the theory of “American exceptional-
ism,” which demonstrates  America’s specific cultural sentiment(s) in apply-
ing the death penalty). 
211 Hadar Aviram & Ryan Newby, Death Row Economics: The Rise of Fis-
cally Prudent Anti-Death Penalty Activism, 28 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33 (2013).  
212 However, identifying a state as “retentionist” requires empirical anal-
ysis as the full picture of the capital system of a state may not emerge. For 
example, as Texas is by for the leading state in executions in the United 
States, it might to more accurate to identify “Texas exceptionalism,” or 
“Southern States Exceptionalism.” Within individual states death sentences 
per county vary, for example, Harris County in Texas has recorded the high-
est execution rates in the country. So even in Texas, it might be appropriate 
to identify a “Harris County Exceptionalism.” For the statistics on the execu-
tion rates per country, see Top 15 Counties by Execution since 1976, THE 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-
county (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).     
213 Scholars such as Francois Guizot, Marc Ancel, Roger Hood and Car-
olyn Hoyle, have persuasively identified that a capital justice system is not 
able to effectively, and consistently, identify who the “worst of the worst” 
criminals are. It is an insurmountable practical obstacle for any capital judi-
cial process to consistently reserve the death penalty for a class of criminal 
described as the “worst of the worst,” see, supra notes 27 and 32. For further 
arguments on the fallacy of maintaining the death penalty for the “worst of 
the worst,” see Jon Yorke, Sovereignty and the Unnecessary Penalty of Death: 
European and United States Perspectives, in IS THE DEATH PENALTY DYING? 
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (Austin Sarat & Jürgen Martschukat 
eds., 2011). Under international law, the Rome Statute of the International 
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Franklin Zimring has provided an illumination of this ex-
ceptionalism thesis by observing a correlation between the his-
torical practice of popular justice (through lynching) in selected 
Southern states, with states that currently impose the death 
penalty.214 For Zimring the “exception,” exists because of the 
heritage, and psychological implications, of lynching, and that:  
Those parts of the United States where mob killings were re-
peatedly inflicted as crime control without government sanction 
are more likely now to view official executions as expressions of 
the will of the community rather than the power of a distant 
and alien government.215  
Staying within the historiography of American exceptional-
ism but providing an alternative framing of the discussion, 
James Whitman has proposed a dignity versus degradation 
thesis as a reason for America being different in its use of the 
punishment.216 Whitman argues we need to have an under-
standing of the differing paths taken by America and many Eu-
ropean countries, by placing the discussions on the relationship 
of punishment with concepts of “degradation,” “harshness” and 
“mercy.”217  This has resulted in an American tradition which 
has a strong opposition to authority creating, “a criminal jus-
tice system long on degradation and short on mercy.”218 In ef-
fect, it is argued that an intellectual elite in Europe has been 
able to cogently reveal the inhumanity and uselessness of the 
death penalty, and the political structures (both domestic and 
regional) have accepted these propositions. As identified above 
                                                                                                                                  
Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998, art. 5(1) identifies the crimes 
of (a) genocide, (b) crimes against humanity, (c) war crimes, and (d) the crime 
of aggression are examples of governments who commits atrocious crimes, 
and which are punishment under international law. Art 77(1) states, “the 
Court may impose one of the following penalties on a person convicted of a 
crime referred to in article 5 of this Statute: (a) Imprisonment for a specified 
number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or (b) A term 
of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person.” The international legal 
regime is demonstrating to the retentionist countries of the world, that pun-
ishing with death is now an antiquated punishment that does not belong in 
our cosmopolitan world of international human rights.            
214 ZIMRING, supra note 174, at 65-140 (as being a phenomenological 
remnant of the southern state’s “vigilante justice”.). 
215 Id. at 89.  
216 WHITMAN, supra note 83.         
217 Id. at 97-150.    
218 Id. at 207. 
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in this paper, the evolution of the intellectual discourse in the 
EU developed from the mid-1980s. In the United States, the in-
tellectual elite are currently in the process of achieving the so-
lidification of the abolitionist sentiment. The road has been 
longer, but the abolitionist community within the United 
States demonstrates that in the future there will be congru-
ence. However, there are some technical political and sociologi-
cal obstacles currently in the way.        
David Garland has identified some of the structural pro-
cesses which are currently maintaining the death penalty in 
America. The “peculiar institution,”219 of the death penalty is 
sustained by, inter alia, what he terms “radical localized de-
mocracy.”220 The complex federal system of government is the 
primary reason for the retentionist states currently maintain-
ing the death penalty. The U.S. Supreme Court is yet to hold 
that the death penalty is per se a violation of the Eighth and/or 
the Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 
and so the state’s freedom to determine capital statutes is not 
yet a question of fundamental Constitutional legitimacy.221 
Hence, Garland maintains:  
American capital punishment persists, despite its conflicts with 
contemporary liberal and humanitarian norms, because of the 
structure of the American polity. That structure makes it difficult 
to abolish the death penalty in the face of majority public opinion 
and deprives governing elites of the opportunity from top-down, 
countermajoritarian reform of the kind that has led to abolition 
elsewhere.222 
However, Jordan Steiker has pointed to a current fragility 
in the American death penalty system. He argues that we are 
now entering a new era of transparency, acceptance of the in-
humanity and the ineffectiveness of the punishment, and con-
sequential stark fiscal issues. Steiker states: 
                                                          
219 See generally DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION (2010). 
220 Id. at 96. 
221 In 1972 the United States Supreme Court suspended the death penal-
ty in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and four years later in Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The state statutes had prima facie included 
safeguards into the capital judicial process. Most prominent was the devel-
opment of the bifurcated process of firstly determining guilt or innocence, and 
then a separate hearing if the defendant is found guilty to determine sen-
tence. In most circumstances, this was either the death penalty or a prison 
term which included up to life without parole. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95.     
222 GARLAND, supra note 219, at 310.  
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Today, the conflict between the legal regulation of the death pen-
alty and its continued use appears more permanent and more de-
structive than the early decades of regulation would have pre-
dicted. In short, the modern American death penalty--with its 
unprecedented costs, alternatives, and legal regulatory frame-
work--seems newly vulnerable to judicial invalidation. Reform of 
the death penalty and its abolition might well be on the same 
path.223  
Steiker observes that in the current vicissitudes – costs, al-
ternative punishments and the labyrinthine appeals processes 
– the capital political and judicial process is experiencing a new 
level of vulnerability, and it thus increasingly susceptible to 
“judicial invalidation.”224 In death penalty litigation, the EU 
amicus curiae brief may be a powerful tool, which defense 
counsel and members of the judiciary can use for their consti-
tutional analysis on the road to the rejection of the punish-
ment. It may be through a combined litigation and political 
strategy that ultimately provides the U.S. Supreme Court with 
the opportunity for final judicial invalidation. Currently, there 
are 32 states that have the death penalty,225 with 18 that do 
not,226 but as the abolitionist states increase, the greater the 
legitimacy for the U.S. Supreme Court to find that the punish-
ment is no longer an acceptable practice under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.     
                                                          
223 Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty: Constitutional Regu-
lation as a Distinctive Feature of American Exceptionalism, 67 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 329, 355 (2013). 
224 Id.  
225 The states with currently retain the death penalty are: Alabama, Ari-
zona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, In-
diana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Washington, Wyoming, (also, U.S. Government and  U.S. Military). 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, States with and without the death penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visit-
ed Oct. 17, 2013). 
226 The states which have abolished the death penalty are: Alaska (abol-
ished in 1957), Connecticut (2012), Hawaii (1957), Illinois (2011), Iowa 
(1965), Maine (1887), Maryland (2013), Massachusetts (1984), Michigan 
(1846), Minnesota (1911), New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), New York 
(2007), North Dakota (1984), Vermont (1964), West Virginia (1965), Wiscon-
sin (1853), and also, the District of Columba (1981).  DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR, States with and without the death penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visit-
ed Oct. 17, 2013). 
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Furthermore, in the Roper oral argument, Justice Scalia 
attempted to demonstrate that the EU’s abolitionist position is 
against some form of popular sovereignty of the region, when 
he asked, “have the countries of the European Union abolished 
the death penalty by popular vote?”227  
Mr. Layton replied: 
I don’t know how they’ve done that, Your Honor.228 
Justice Scalia continued: 
I thought they did it by reason of a judgment of a court…which 
required all of them to abolish it…And I thought that some of the 
public opinion polls in...a number of the countries support the 
death penalty.229  
Mr. Layton stated:  
I believe that there are countries in Europe who abolished it be-
cause of their membership in the European Union—230  
The removal of the death penalty in the EU began with the 
western Member States, and then abolition solidified into a re-
gional internal position and is now incorporated into the Treaty 
and Charter. Abolition then evolved into a focus of the external 
project. Mr. Layton’s response identified abolition of the death 
penalty in the EU is a contingent position for membership. 
There are some examples, however, of public support for the 
death penalty. Aleksandra Gliszczyńska, Katarzyna Sękowska, 
and Rowan Wieruszewski, referred to the research conducted 
by the Public Opinion Research Centre in Poland, which stated 
that in 2004, 77 per cent of people polled declared that they fa-
vored the death penalty. 231 But, this has not grown into a polit-
ical platform for the reintroduction of the punishment.232 Agata 
Fijalkowski has noted the existence of public support for the 
death penalty during the membership discussions in the 
Ukraine in 1995.233 She observed, however, that, “[i]n the end, 
                                                          
227 Oral Argument at 12:45, Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (No. 03-
633). 
228 Id. at 12:49.    
229 Id. at 12:50.  
230 Id. at 13:05.  
231 THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN POLAND, THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN THE OSCE AREA 24 (2006), available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/20752. 
See also Fijalkowski, supra note 27, at 147-68.  
232 Id.  
233 Application of Ukraine for Membership to the Council of Europe, 
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public opinion is only a sentiment, and one that cannot over-
ride serious human rights concerns and questions. For Europe, 
education is the key to making informed decisions.”234 Fur-
thermore, William Schabas, Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, 
argue that such sentiment in favor of the death penalty ap-
pears to be higher when vicious crimes occur and are reported 
in the media.235 So it is a sentiment, which is correlative with 
heinous crimes in society, and is thus determined by events, 
not a continuous mode of rationality. It is evident that if there 
are examples of public support for the death penalty in the EU, 
they do not evolve into a discourse platform from which to en-
gage the political and legal processes to reintroduce the pun-
ishment. Hence, if there are examples of public support for the 
death penalty in Europe, it is a weak support and, in all cir-
cumstances it dissolves.  
Then Justice Breyer contributed to the dialogue in the 
Roper oral argument by engaging with a historical sentiment 
on the scholarship on English law, when he asked: 
Is there any indication? I mean, I’ve never seen any either way, 
to tell you the truth, but...that Madison or Jefferson or whoever, 
when they were writing the Constitution, would have thought 
what happened elsewhere, let’s say, in Britain or in the Brit-
ish...they were a British colony. They did think Blackstone was 
relevant...would have thought it was totally irrelevant what hap-
pened elsewhere in the world to the word unusual. Is there any 
indication in any debate or any of the ratification conventions?236   
Mr. Layton:  
Nothing that I have seen has suggested that—…237 
Justice Breyer:  
Abraham Lincoln used to study Blackstone and I think he 
                                                                                                                                  
Opinion 190/1995, Parliamentary Assembly, September 26, 1995, available 
at, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?fileid=13929 
&lang=EN&search=T3BpbmlvbiBOby4gMTkwICgxOTk1KQ== (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2013). 
234 Fijalkowski, supra note 27, at 287. 
235 See, William A. Schabas, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: STRATEGIES FOR ABOLITION, 309-11 (Peter Hodgkinson 
& William A. Schabas eds., 2004); see also, HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 27, at 
350-82. 
236 Oral Argument at 13:42, Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (No. 03-
633).  
237 Id. at 14:14.   
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thought that the Founding Fathers studied Blackstone, and all 
that happened in England was relevant, is there some special 
reason why what happens abroad would not be relevant here? 
Relevant. I’m not saying controlling.238  
Mr. Layton:  
There’s a special reason why Blackstone would be relevant be-
cause that was the law from which they were operating when 
they put this language into the Constitution.239  
Justice Breyer:  
Absolutely, and they, I guess, were looking at English practices, 
and would they have thought it was wrong to look abroad as a 
relevant feature?240  
Mr. Layton:  
I don’t know the answer to that, Your Honor.241  
Justice Breyer affirmed the position that the framers of the 
Eighth Amendment, in 1789-90, were aware of contemporary 
English opinion, and they thought that Eighteenth Century 
values in England were relevant to what constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment in America.242 The Founding Fathers 
were very aware of the writings of William Blackstone, espe-
cially the Commentaries on the Laws of England,243 who was 
                                                          
238 Id. at 14:18. 
239 Id. at 14:32.  
240 Id. at 14:39.  
241 Id. at 14:49.   
242 See Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments In-
flicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (For scholarship on 
the drafting and original meaning of the Eight Amendment); David B. 
Hershenov, Why Must Punishment be Unusual as Well as Cruel to be Uncon-
stitutional?, 16 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY 1, 77-98 (2002); Megan J. Ryan, 
Does the Eighteenth Amendment Punishment’s Clause Prohibit Only Punish-
ment which are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567 (2010); 
LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 61 (1989); John D. Bessler, The 
Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the 
21st Century, 2 BR. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES (2013) 297-451.   
243 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-
1769) 4:74-91, 350-51 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION (1769), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_3_1-2s8.html; See gen-
erally, Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late 
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189 
(1984) (Lutz analyzed various European influences on early American politi-
cal perceptions. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has cited 
William Blackstone in numerous capital cases, in its jurisprudence on the 
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influenced by John Locke’s theory on natural law, natural 
rights, and the concept of, “life, liberty and the pursuit of hap-
piness,” which is included in the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence.244  
Friedrich Hayek has charted the evolution of the rule of 
law in America and pointed to the significant influence of 
Blackstone.245 Robert Stein notes that “the writings of the great 
British legal scholars: Edward Coke, William Blackstone, Da-
vid Hume, and of course, John Locke . . . had such an enormous 
influence on our founding fathers.”246 John Bessler, in his thor-
ough research, has demonstrated that the Founding Fathers 
were also very aware of Cesare Beccaria, the Enlightenment 
thinker against the death penalty.247 It should also be remem-
                                                                                                                                  
Eighth Amendment); See e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Rob-
erts v. Louisiana 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 
(1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Sim-
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JOHN C. EASTMAN AND RAYMOND B. MARCIN, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY 1-125 (3d ed. 2009). 
245 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Origins of the Rule of Law, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 162 (1960). 
246 Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does it Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 
293, 298 (2009). 
247 See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, 
America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. 
POL’Y 195, 207-08 (2009). John Bessler provides a scholarly review of the ear-
ly use of Beccaria’s work. Bessler states, “In 1770, the American patriot and 
lawyer John Adams famously defended the British soldiers accused of murder 
in the Boston massacre, and Adams showed close familiarity with the reform-
minded Italian criminologist. In taking on this unpopular cause, Adams-
though a death penalty supporter-eloquently invoked Beccaria in his opening 
statement on behalf of his clients:  
I am for the prisoners at the bar and shall apologize for it only in the 
words of the Marquis Beccaria.  “If by supporting the rights of mankind, 
and of invincible truth, I shall contribute to save from the agonies of 
death one unfortunate victim of tyranny, or ignorance, equally fatal, his 
blessings and years of transport shall be sufficient consolation to me for 
the contempt of all mankind” 
(citing Marvin Wolfgang, Introduction to CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES 
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bered that Thomas Paine, a Founding Father, argued against 
the state right to the death penalty, except in exceptional cir-
cumstances of a threat to the life of the nation.248 Furthermore, 
in the drafting debates on the text of the Eight Amendment in 
1789, Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire, argued that when 
punishment technologies, such as through modernized prison 
systems, were improved by being more humane and effective, 
there would be no need for the death penalty, when he stated:  
It is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve 
whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in fu-
ture to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because 
they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and de-
terring others from the commission of it could be invented, it 
would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we 
have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be re-
strained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this 
kind.249    
The Annals of Congress of 1789 reveal that William Smith 
of South Carolina objected to the words “nor cruel and unusual 
punishments,” because he thought them, “too indefinite.”250 It 
can be inferred that he feared a lack of clarity would result and 
the parameters for identifying constitutionally permissible 
punishment would be very difficult to achieve. Samuel Liver-
more had stated that leniency should be a determining feature 
in punishment, and that only “necessary” laws should be 
adopted.251 So when the death penalty becomes “unnecessary,” 
the question should arise as to it being abandoned.252 Hence, 
                                                                                                                                  
AND PUNISHMENT, at ii (1996)).    
248 THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in COLLECTED WRITINGS 213 (1995) (In 
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 See Jon Yorke, Sovereignty and the Unnecessary Penalty of Death: Eu-
ropean and United States Perspectives, in IS THE DEATH PENALTY DYING? 
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the Founding Fathers did not envision that the death penalty 
should remain a punishment within the American criminal jus-
tice system in perpetuity. There would become a time when it 
would be unnecessary, and in our contemporary times of effec-
tive policing and imprisonment, it now appears that we have 
arrived at the moment in which the death penalty should be 
abandoned.  
In 1787, the American abolitionist, Benjamin Rush, lec-
tured against the death penalty. In 1797, he published a pam-
phlet, Considerations on the Injustice and Impolicy of Punish-
ing Murderers by Death, in which he argued that the 
punishment was “contrary to reason.”253 Applying Livermore’s 
construction of “necessary” punishments, reason dictates that 
there would become a time when the death penalty would be 
regarded as an illegitimate punishment. The arguments by 
Rush and Livermore should be considered as realized today. 
Max Weber’s view that the state is recognized through the 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the en-
forcement of its order”254 is a useful guide for analyzing the 
process. In the political and legal metamorphosis that has oc-
curred in the era of human rights, the death penalty should 
now be considered to be an “illegitimate” use of physical force.  
In the Roper oral argument, Justice Kennedy engaged with 
the issue of whether there should be some quid pro quo in the 
use of comparative perspectives. In essence, if the rest of the 
world needs to take note of legal developments in America, 
America should also give credence to what happens in human 
rights regions and in Member State constitutional courts. Jus-
tice Kennedy asked:  
Do we ever take the position that what we do here should influ-
ence what people think elsewhere?255   
                                                                                                                                  
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (Austin Sarat & Jürgen 
Martschukat eds., 2011) (arguing that the death penalty is now an “unneces-
sary punishment” in America); see also, Jon Yorke, Capital Punishment, in 
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS 140, 143 (Joel Krieger et 
al. eds. 2012). 
253 Hugo Adam Bedau, An Abolitionist’s Survey of the Death Penalty in 
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254 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 45 (1978).  
255 Oral Argument at 14:48, Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (No. 03-
633). 
2013] THE E.U. AND THE DEATH PENALTY 53 
Mr. Layton:  
I have not seen that overtly in any of the Court’s opinions, Your 
Honor.256  
Justice Kennedy:  
You thought that Mr. Jefferson thought that what we did here 
had no bearing on the rest of the world?257  
Mr. Layton:  
I think Mr. Jefferson thought that. I think many of the Founders 
thought that they were leading the world, and I have no objection 
to us leading the world, but Mr. Jefferson’s lead of the world was 
through the legislature not through the courts.258  
Justice Ginsburg:  
But did he not also say that to lead the world, we would have to 
show a decent respect for the opinions of mankind?259  
Mr. Layton:  
That . . . may well be.260 
Justice Kennedy opened the door for the issue of the cir-
cumstance of American values being expressed to the world 
and Justice Ginsburg questioned the appropriateness of Ameri-
ca disregarding the “opinions of mankind,” when the country 
claims to “lead the world.”261 In both Justice Kennedy and Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s questions, it appears implicit that the inclusion 
of the death penalty in this “leadership” is questionable. Harold 
Koh, US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor, between 1998 and 2001, and the Stirling 
Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, has argued 
that in the field of foreign relations, the death penalty is Amer-
ica’s Achilles’ heel “in almost every multilateral human rights 
forum.”262  He argued, “As Americans committed to transna-
tional legal process, we must do what we can to make the day 
arrive when this nation, conceived in liberty, again pays decent 
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54 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  4-1 
respect to the world opinion on the death penalty.”263  
Placing the way in which America implements punish-
ments, within the complexities of international dialogue, is a 
difficult but necessary endeavor. Here the fields of internation-
al relations and international judicial communication can prove 
illuminating. Gábor Halmai explains: 
Judicial use of foreign law is a product of the globalization of the 
practice of modern constitutionalism: it has been made possible 
by a dialogue among high court judges with constitutional juris-
diction around the world, conducted through mutual citation and 
increasingly direct interactions. This growing “constitutional 
cross-fertilization” can afford not only a tool for better judgments, 
but also for the construction of a “global legal system”. The glob-
alization of constitutional law means that constitutionalism is no 
longer the privilege of the nation-state, but has now instead be-
come a worldwide concept and standard.264 
The death penalty is an internationalized constitutional 
question. This issue should no longer be viewed as a “privilege 
of the nation-state.”265 In delivering the judgment for the Court 
that the execution of juvenile offenders was unconstitutional, 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause, Justice Kennedy made a reference to the 
EU brief,266 and held, “It is proper that we acknowledge the 
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the ju-
venile death penalty.”267 In the Roper oral argument cited 
above, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the application of 
the death penalty has global implications. As such the admin-
istration of the punishment necessitates that at least the high-
est domestic judiciary (here the United States Supreme Court), 
consider the policy and judicial activity which occurs in the in-
ternational arena. Halmai has taken such a judicial considera-
tion of global norms and practices as an example of the “global-
ization of constitutional law.”268  
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However, as in Atkins, Justice Scalia could not accept the 
use of international perspectives in Roper, and he was of the 
opinion that through the majority holding in the case, an ille-
gitimate encroachment upon American sovereignty had oc-
curred. He stated, “Though the views of our own citizens are 
essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, the views of 
other countries and the so-called international community take 
center stage.”269 He did not “believe that approval by ‘other na-
tions and peoples’ should buttress our commitment to Ameri-
can principles any more than (what should logically follow) dis-
approval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should weaken that 
commitment.”270  
Justice Scalia’s firm rejection of the benefit of international 
opinion and law for US constitutional adjudication was criti-
cized by Justice O’Connor.271 Although dissenting in the case, 
she sought to open the door for international opinion in re-
stricted circumstances. Justice O’Connor stated that interna-
tional values could be used to provide a “confirmatory role” to 
an already existing United States punishment practice, but 
that it should not be used to dictate change of state penal sys-
tems. Justice O’Connor held: 
[T]his Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity certain-
ly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, 
the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we 
should not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and 
international values, especially where the international commu-
nity has reached clear agreement—expressed in international 
law or in the domestic laws of individual countries—that a par-
ticular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental 
human rights. At least, the existence of an international consen-
sus of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a 
consonant and genuine American consensus. The instant case 
presents no such domestic consensus, however, and the recent 
emergence of an otherwise global consensus does not alter that 
basic fact.272            
The last sentence of this passage of Justice O’Connor’s dis-
sent reaches the core of her consideration of the sovereign state 
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right of the death penalty. In her opinion, if the whole interna-
tional community had reached a consensus on a specific aspect 
of the death penalty, in this case, the execution of juveniles, 
such consensus could not affect the American consensus.273 The 
United States must come to the conclusion on its own and then 
view the position of the international community. However, the 
opinions of the international community through amicus curiae 
briefs, can serve more than to “confirm the reasonableness of a 
consonant and genuine American consensus”274 as they can act 
as a lens of human rights to help evaluate the American capital 
judicial system. Here, the role of EU amicus curiae briefs may 
prove useful,275 and rather than being confined to providing a 
“confirmatory” role, they can provide analysis, the means to 
test the legitimacy of state practice, and reveal the extent of 
global norms.    
V. ACTION IN THE MULTILATERAL FORA 
The EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty state: 
The EU will raise the issue of the death penalty in relevant mul-
tilateral fora and seize all appropriate opportunities to put before 
them initiatives aimed at introducing a moratorium on the use of 
the death penalty and, in due course, abolition. Whenever appro-
priate, the EU will seek to include references to the establish-
ment of a moratorium on executions and the abolition of the 
death penalty in documents produced under the proceedings of 
these multilateral fora.276  
The EU co-operates with relevant international organiza-
tions in encouraging states to follow an abolitionist agenda, not 
                                                          
273 Simmons, 534 U.S. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
274 Id. 
275 See, e.g., Brief of The European Union and Members of the Interna-
tional Community as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Maharaj v. Secre-
tary for the Department of Corrections for the State of Florida, 549 U.S. 819 
(2006); S. Adele Shank & John B. Quigley, Brief of The European Union and 
Members of the International Community as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Medellin v Dretke, Case No. 04-5928; see also ibid, Brief of Amici Cu-
riae: The European Union and Members of the International Community in 
Support of Petitioner, in the case of Maharaj v. Secretary for the Department 
of Corrections for the State of Florida, Case No. 05-1555;  Brief of Shank and 
Quigley for The European Union & Members of the International Community 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 131 S. Ct. 
1197 (2011); Bustillo v. Johnson,  548 U.S. 331 (2006).  
276 EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, supra note 4. 
2013] THE E.U. AND THE DEATH PENALTY 57 
least by ratifying and complying with international treaties277 
and standards relating to the death penalty. An example of this 
close co-operation is displayed when the EU and the CoE issue 
a joint declaration on the occasion of the World/European Day 
against Death Penalty on October 10, in which they jointly re-
affirm their opposition to the use of capital punishment in all 
circumstances, and their commitment to the abolition of the 
death penalty worldwide.278 In this context, both the EU and 
the CoE have repeatedly urged Belarus, the only European 
country that still imposes the death penalty, “to introduce a 
moratorium with a view to complete abolition.”279 In connection 
with this joint approach, the EU Delegation organized together 
with CoE staff a joint EU/CoE exhibition, “Death is not justice,” 
in Minsk on October 8, 2010.280 
Another important platform for EU abolitionist action is in 
the United Nations General Assembly. In 1994, a resolution for 
a moratorium on the death penalty was presented for the first 
time at the United Nations General Assembly by the Italian 
government and it only lost by eight votes.281 In 1999, at the 
                                                          
277 See Appendix 1, all EU Member States have ratified Protocol No. 6 to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty.  All EU Member States 
apart from Poland have ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the Interna-
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death penalty, as well as Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the 
death penalty in all circumstances. 
278 Press Release, European Union, Joint Declaration by Thorbjørn Ja-
gland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and Catherine Ashton, 
European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
on the European and World Day against the Death Penalty, Brussels Euro-
pean Union (Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132777.pdf. 
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280 Press Release, European External Action Service, Delegation of the 
European Union to Belarus, “Death is not Justice:” Exhibition in Minsk to 
mark European and World Day Against the Death Penalty (Oct. 8, 2010), 
available at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/press_corner/all_news/ 
news/2010/2010_10_08_en.htm.   
281 Subsequently, since 1997, through Italy’s initiative, and since 1999 
through the EU’s endeavor, the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights (“UNCHR”) approved a resolution calling for a moratorium on execu-
tions with a view to completely abolishing the death penalty. This occurred 
every year until 2005, as the UNCHR held its final meeting in March 2006. 
Then due to the transition period the EU focus changed to the General As-
sembly.  
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54th meeting of the UN General Assembly, then Finish Foreign 
Minister, Tarja Halonen, called on behalf of the EU for the 
worldwide restriction of the death penalty for the most serious 
crimes, and for all retentionist countries to initiate a moratori-
um which should then lead to abolition.282  She also submitted 
on behalf of the EU a resolution to the General Assembly, 
which called for a moratorium by all retentionist states.283  
However, the EU’s original ambition to introduce a resolution 
on the moratorium of the death penalty during the 1999 Gen-
eral Assembly session did not materialize and the respective 
proposal was withdrawn.284   
The withdrawal of the draft resolution caused an internal 
EU debate, and William Schabas observed that the “European 
Union decided to withdraw the resolution rather than see it 
transformed beyond recognition.”285 Christopher Patten, former 
European Commissioner for External Relations, defended the 
withdrawal in the European Parliament in February 16, 2000 
by arguing that it had been necessary “to freeze our resolution 
on the death penalty or risk the passing of a resolution that 
would have incorporated wholly unacceptable arguments that 
asserted that human rights are not universally applicable and 
valid.”286  Commissioner Patten reviewed the issue in his 
speech to the European Parliament on October 25, 2000, stat-
ing that “following intensive negotiation, we decided at last 
year’s General Assembly in November that no resolution was 
better than a fatally flawed text, and therefore, the [EU] should 
not pursue its initiative.”287 Further, retentionist countries 
“will continue to resist strongly any efforts to secure a General 
                                                          
282 Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Address at the 54th UN 
General Assembly, New York (Sept. 21, 1999), available at 
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283 Memorandum by the European Union at the 54th United Nations 
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285 William A. Schabas, The United Nations and the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty, in ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY: INTERNATIONAL 
INITIATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS, 30-31 (Jon Yorke ed., 2008).     
286 The Rt. Hon. Christopher Patten, Speech before the European Par-
liament (Feb. 16, 2000), quoted in William A. Schabas, International Law, 
Politics, Diplomacy and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 13 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 417, 437 (2004). 
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Assembly resolution.”288 However, the Italian UN Permanent 
Representative in New York, Ambassador Francesco Paolo Ful-
ci, expressed doubts about the necessity of the withdrawal of 
the draft resolution by stating, “We, European Ambassadors, 
received the order from Bruxelles to suspend any initiative be-
cause of insufficient votes. I can assume that that wasn’t the 
case, because I had personally contacted 90 Ambassadors that 
granted support.”289  
Such ambivalence demonstrated that while the EU’s ex-
ternal strategy remained a focus, the specific strategy in the 
General Assembly was not realized, so the impetus was rea-
ligned in the Commission on Human Rights. On December 19, 
2006, the Finnish Presidency of the EU read out a political dec-
laration, committing its signatories to work towards the aboli-
tion of the death penalty and calling, where the death penalty 
still existed, for its use to be progressively restricted, insisting 
that it be carried out according to minimum standards and, in 
the meantime, urging the establishment of a moratorium on 
executions.290  
In 2007, the idea of introducing a resolution in the General 
Assembly was again discussed. This time, the German Presi-
dency of the Council of the EU, initiated a Declaration by the 
Presidency on behalf of the EU on the occasion of the Third 
World Congress against the Death Penalty, in Paris on Febru-
ary 1-3, 2007.291  It announced that “the EU will intensify its 
initiatives in international fora, including the United Na-
tions.”292 In addition, on April 26, 2007, the European Parlia-
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ment adopted a resolution on the initiative for a universal 
moratorium on the death penalty, which:  
. . . encouraged the EU to seize the existing opportunities and 
press its case and calls on the EU Member States and the EU to 
immediately submit – seeking the co-sponsorship of countries in 
other continents – a resolution for a universal moratorium on the 
death penalty to the current UN General Assembly.293 
The EU Foreign Ministers decided in June 2007 that the 
EU would introduce, in the framework of a cross-regional alli-
ance within the United Nations, a resolution against the death 
penalty at the 62nd UN General Assembly.294  Portugal, taking 
over the EU Presidency from Germany in the second semester 
of 2007, concerted the EU support to this cross-regional alli-
ance, which eventually consisted of Albania, Angola, Brazil, 
Croatia, Gabon, Mexico, New Zealand, The Philippines, Portu-
gal on behalf of the EU, and Timor Leste.295 This landmark 
resolution 62/149 (2007), calling for a worldwide moratorium on 
the use of the death penalty, was successfully adopted by 
UNGA62 on December 18, 2007, with 104 Member States vot-
ing in favor, 29 abstaining, and 54 voting in opposition.296   
The collective campaigns in the United Nations by the abo-
litionist governments, the EU, and other international organi-
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zations, as well as, various non-governmental organizations 
such as Hands Off Cain, Ensemble Contre la Peine de Mort, 
and the Communita di San Egidio, finally brought about this 
historical United Nations decision.297 One important element 
for success was the EU’s ability to embed its efforts in a cross-
regional alliance with a truly cross-regional character. 
The Slovenian Presidency of the EU, in the first half of 
2008, decided to build on the momentum created by the 2007 
resolution and support the initiative to introduce a follow-up 
resolution in the 2008 General Assembly.298  The subsequent 
French Presidency supervised the EU’s contribution to the 
cross-regional alliance in their outreach to further increase the 
supporting votes.299 On December 18, 2008, the 63rd UN Gen-
eral Assembly adopted resolution 63/168 (2008), reaffirming 
the 2007 resolution’s call for a moratorium on the use of the 
death penalty with 106 in favor, 46 against, and 34 absten-
tions.300 Accordingly, following the bi-annual review indicated 
in the 2008 resolution a further resolution was passed on De-
cember 21 2010.301 The General Assembly adopted resolution 
65/206 (2010), reaffirming previous Assembly resolutions 
62/149 and 63/168, with 109 in favor, 41 against, and 
35 abstentions.302 The EU had significantly contributed to the 
outreach campaign by supporting a cross-regional alliance, and 
in a Joint Communication to the Parliament and Council, the 
EU stated it will:  
increase its effectiveness at the UN, building cross-regional coali-
tions, supporting the UN system’s human rights mechanisms and 
promoting better synchronization with its actions at bilateral and 
in other multilateral forums.303    
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Most recently, in 2012, the General Assembly adopted res-
olution 67/176 (2012) with 110 votes in favor, 39 against, and 
36 abstentions.304 In the resolution, the General Assembly 
called upon all States to respect international standards that 
provide safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of 
those facing the death penalty and requested States to provide 
the Secretary-General with information in that regard.305 It al-
so requested States to make available relevant information 
with regard to their use of the death penalty, which can con-
tribute to informed and transparent national debates, to pro-
gressively restrict the use of the death penalty and reduce the 
number of offences for which it may be imposed, and to estab-
lish a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the 
death penalty.  The General Assembly also called upon States 
that have abolished the death penalty not to reintroduce it and 
encouraged them to share their experience in that regard.306  
VI. TRANSFER OF PERSONS IN SECURITY CIRCUMSTANCES 
Since Soering v. United Kingdom,307 European human 
rights law has acted as a vanguard for people being extradited 
to a receiving state, where they may face a death sentence 
and/or an execution.308 Antonio Muñoz Aunión observes that 
judicial scrutiny in extradition circumstances is a stronger 
mechanism than political diplomacy alone, for preventing a re-
ceiving state from imposing the punishment.309  
In Soering, it was determined that when a suspect is ex-
tradited to a receiving state, assurances must be provided that 
                                                                                                                                  
wards a More Effective Approach, at 15, COM (2011) 886 final (Dec. 12, 2011). 
304 Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res, 67/176, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/67/176 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
305 Id.  
306 Id.  
307 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 436 (1989); see 
also Alastair Mowbray, The Creativity of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV 57, 66-68 (2005). 
308 See William A. Schabas, Indirect Abolition: Capital Punishment’s Role 
in Extradition Law and Practice, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 581 
(2003); Jon Yorke, Europe’s Judicial Inquiry in Extradition Cases: Closing the 
Door on the Death Penalty, 29 EUR. L. REV. 546 (2004).     
309See Antonio Muñoz Aunión, The European Union Responds to the 
Death Penalty With New Competencies, in TOWARDS UNIVERSAL ABOLITION OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY (Luis Arroyo, Paloma Biglino & William A. Schabas eds., 
2012). 
2013] THE E.U. AND THE DEATH PENALTY 63 
the death penalty will not be administered.310 The assurances 
must be “adequate,” as a state prosecutor’s mere declaration to 
a jury that Europe considers it inappropriate to impose a death 
sentence, would not comply with the prohibition against inhu-
man punishment in ECHR Article 3.311 This human rights 
practice through judicial scrutiny has been extended to persons 
deported since the case of Bader and Others v. Sweden,312 and 
to circumstances where prisoners are transferred from an oc-
cupying military power to the reformed national government in 
times of war as illustrated in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United 
Kingdom.313  
Furthermore, Charter Article 19(2) also provides a prohibi-
tion on extradition in capital cases as it states: 
[n]o one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a [s]tate 
where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to 
the death penalty…or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.314   
This Article provides a complete restriction on Member 
States, as extradition is not allowed when the death penalty 
may be sought by the receiving state. Adán Nieto Martín, iden-
tifies that within Article 19(2):  
The EU expresses one of its distinguishing marks which is aboli-
tionism. It affirms that there is no room for judicial cooperation, 
with regard to extradition, when the criminal proceedings might 
lead to the imposition of the death penalty with some probability 
of it being applied or when extradition is requested to impose 
that penalty.315     
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When death sentences are imposed, there is a real possibil-
ity that the inmate will suffer from adverse cognitive effects 
created by the “death row phenomenon,” which constitutes “in-
human and degrading treatment”316. These circumstances may 
be attributed to the age of the inmate, his mental state upon 
incarceration, the incarceration conditions on death row, 
treatment on death row, the length of the incarceration period, 
and method of execution.317 Any receiving state’s capital judi-
cial system is incompatible with the European Court of Human 
Rights’ jurisprudence on the death row phenomenon.318     
VII. PROHIBITION OF THE TRADE IN EXECUTION TECHNOLOGIES 
Another example of the growing complexity of the EU’s 
strategy is demonstrated through the 2005 Council Regulation 
1236/2005 on the prohibition of trade in equipment that may be 
used in the administration of the death penalty.319 This is the 
first of its kind and is a unique piece of regional legislation.320 
Regulation 1236/2005 must be understood as part of a package 
of EU legislation dealing with security-related export controls, 
consisting namely of the Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP of December 8 2008, defining common rules 
governing control of exports of military technology and equip-
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ment, 321 Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 on dual-use 
goods (military and civil use),322 and recast in 2009 as Council 
Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, setting up a Community regime 
for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of du-
al-use items.323 The introductory note, paragraph 7, of Regula-
tion 1236/2005 states: 
These rules are instrumental in promoting respect for human life 
and for fundamental human rights and thus serve the purpose of 
protecting public morals. Such rules should ensure that Commu-
nity economic operators do not derive any benefits from trade 
which either promotes or otherwise facilitates the implementa-
tion of policies on capital punishment or on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which are 
not compatible with the relevant EU Guidelines, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and international 
conventions and treaties.324  
Article 3(1) states, “Any export of goods which have no 
practical use other than for the purpose of capital punishment 
or for the purpose of torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment, listed in Annex II, shall be 
prohibited, irrespective of the origin of such equipment.”325 Ar-
ticle 4(1) prohibits the import of such, “goods,” into Europe.326 
Article 5(1) states, “For any export of goods that could be used 
for the purpose of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, listed in Annex III, an authoriza-
tion shall be required, irrespective of the origin of such 
goods...”327 In Annex II of the Regulation, “goods designed for 
the execution of human beings,” include gallows and guillo-
tines, electric chairs, air-tight vaults made of steel and glass, 
which are designed for the purpose of the execution of human 
beings by the administration of a lethal gas or other substances 
                                                          
321 Council Common Position (EC) No. 2008/944/CFSP of 8 Dec. 2008, 
2008 O.J. (L 335) 99, 100, 102-03 (replacing a preexisting Code of Conduct on 
the matter, and subsequently supplemented by Common Military List of the 
European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 85) 1). 
322 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 of 30 June 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 
159) 1.  
323 Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 29 May 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 
134) 1. 
324 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005, supra note 319.  
325 Id.  
326 Id.  
327 Id.  
66 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  4-1 
and automatic drug injection systems, designed for the purpose 
of execution of human beings by the administration of a lethal 
chemical substance.328 Hence, this regulation makes it a legal 
requirement within the EU for Member States to examine 
goods to identify whether they are intended for use in an exe-
cution.  
Regulation 1236/2005 was the subject of litigation in the 
British High Court case of R (on the application of Zagorski 
and Baze) v. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills.329 The case concerned the export of sodium thiopental by 
Archimedes Pharma UK Ltd, a pharmaceutical company based 
in the UK to various prisons in the US.330 The second litigant, 
Ralph Baze, had previously submitted a case before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, where he claimed the lethal injection protocol 
in Kentucky violated the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.331 Before considering the British High 
Court case, it is useful to consider the American litigation.     
In Baze v. Rees, a 2008 case, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of lethal injection, which included 
a specific consideration of the substances used for the execution 
protocol.332 In a detailed law journal article in 2002, Deborah 
Denno clearly set out the various lethal injection protocols 
across the United States,333 and the lethal injection method in 
Kentucky was implemented through three drugs: sodium thio-
pental, which is an anesthetic, pancuronium bromide which 
prevent respiration, and potassium chloride, which induces 
cardiac arrest and ultimately causes death.334 However, there 
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agent that inhibits all muscular-skeletal movements and, by paralyzing the 
diaphragm, stops respiration. Potassium chloride, the third drug, interferes 
with the electrical signals that stimulate the contractions of the heart, induc-
ing cardiac arrest. The proper administration of the first drug ensures that 
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was also an acceptance of the constitutionality of a single drug 
protocol, with the use of a barbiturate such as pentobarbital.335   
At this time, the pharmaceutical company Hospira was the 
only company in the United States licensed by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to manufacture sodium thiopental 
for use in executions.336 However, in 2009, Hospira stated it 
would discontinue its production of the substance.337 This 
caused the supplies of sodium thiopental to diminish in the 
prisons of the individual states that impose executions, and 
some prisons ran out of the controlled substances, including in 
Tennessee and Arizona.338 However, in 2010, following the ob-
taining of new sources of supplies of sodium thiopental, the 
state executed Jeffrey Landrigan.339  
The UK human rights charity Reprieve340 questioned the 
source of the new supplies, and after investigations it became 
evident that the substances were exported from within the 
EU.341 The company exporting sodium thiopental to the United 
States was Archimedes Pharma UK Ltd.342 
So Edmund Zagorski and Ralph Baze343 petitioned the 
British High Court to rule that the Secretary of State for Busi-
ness, Innovation and Skills, should prohibit the marketing and 
selling of sodium thiopental to the United States and impose a 
control order pursuant to the Export Control Act 2002. Fur-
thermore, petitioners argued that the trading in pharmacologi-
cal substances used for lethal injection was a breach of Regula-
tion 1236/2005 and a violation of European human rights, 
specifically the ECHR Articles 2(1) and 3, Protocol No. 13, and 
the Charter.344 In the case, Mr. Vince Cable, the Secretary of 
State, acknowledged that the “United Kingdom firmly opposes 
the death penalty in all circumstances as a matter of princi-
                                                                                                                                  
the prisoner does not experience any pain associated with the paralysis 
and caused by the second and third drugs.”) 
335 Id. at 56-57.  
336 Zagorski, supra note 329, ¶ 11.  
337 Id.  
338 Id. ¶¶ 11-12.  
339 See Brewer v. Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. 445 (2010). 
340 Zagorski, supra note 329, ¶ 15. 
341 Id. ¶¶ 40-45.  
342 Id. ¶¶ 20-23. 
343 Baze, 553 U.S. 35 (Mr. Ralph Baze was one of the petitioners in the 
British High Court).    
344 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 7.   
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ple,”345 but stated that there were no controls on exporting the 
drug, and that it was not appropriate for the Secretary of State 
to impose an export control order under sections 5(2) and (4) of 
the Export Control Act 2002.346 In effect, although sodium thio-
pental was potentially being used in the United States to im-
pose human rights violations through the imposition of lethal 
injection, it still was a “general anaesthetic and has a number 
of other legitimate uses.”347 The British High Court held that 
“sodium thiopental” did not fall within Articles 3 and 5 of Regu-
lation 1236/2005. The court held that because Annex II and III 
do not specifically include “sodium thiopental,” the export was 
not prohibited.348 The court provided a literal interpretation of 
the Regulation, as it only referred to the, “automatic drug in-
jection system,” and not to the contents, including the lethal 
pharmacological substances. So the Court thought that the 
Resolution only applied to the needle and syringe, but not the 
substance. The court also held that because of the territorial 
constraints placed by the ECHR Article 1, it could not be relied 
upon,349 that the Charter only recognized the rights under the 
ECHR as they are limited by Article 1, and that Article 51(1) of 
the Charter was not violated by not imposing a ban.350  
                                                          
345 Zagorski supra note 329, ¶ 9.  
346 Export Control Act, 2002, c. 28 (U.K.). (Section 5(2) authorizes the 
Secretary of State to impose, “Controls of any kind may be imposed for the 
purpose of giving effect to any Community provision or other international 
obligation of the United Kingdom,” and in the Schedule 2(1) “export controls 
may be imposed in relation to any goods the exploitation or use of which is 
capable of having a relevant consequence”).        
347 Zagorski, supra note 329, ¶ 9. (“. . . Sodium Thiopental is a medicine. 
Its primary use is as an anesthetic...I have considered the fact that an export 
restriction imposed by the United Kingdom is very unlikely to be effective in 
preventing any execution from taking place in the United Kingdom, given 
that the drug is generally available and traded globally”). 
348 Id. ¶ 46 (stating Regulation 1236/2005, “imposes precise prohibitions 
on the export of certain specified goods and a requirement to impose authori-
sational requirements on certain other specified goods.” It does not impose a 
general prohibition on the export of goods which “could be used” for the pur-
pose of capital punishment nor does it require Member States to impose ex-
port controls on such goods.).    
349 Id. ¶¶ 51-59. ECHR Article 1 (“The High Contracting Parties shall se-
cure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention”). 
350 Id. ¶¶ 60-76 (explaining how the export violated a common law pro-
tection of human rights that was also rejected in ¶¶ 77-84. Charter Article 
51(1)  stated “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions 
and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and 
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However, following the British High Court’s decision, the 
UK government changed its position. Mr Vince Cable made a 
statement to the High Court on November 29, 2010, indicating 
that the UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
would issue an order under s. 6 of the Export Control Act 2002, 
controlling the export of sodium thiopental to the United 
States. If the final use in the country receiving the products is 
for the death penalty then export will be denied. 351 
There had been concerns in the European Parliament, and 
within civil society, over the textual deficiencies of the Regula-
tion, as Zagorski demonstrates.352  It is evident by the decision 
of the British High Court that the Regulation can be easily by-
passed through quixotic literal interpretation. An Amnesty In-
ternational report, “From Words To Deeds: Making the EU Ban 
on the Trade in ‘Tools of Torture’ a Reality,”353 published in 
February 2010, led to a European Parliament Resolution on 
June 17, 2010, demanding action by the Commission.354 A par-
ticular plea had been that a “torture end-use catch all” clause, 
originally suggested to the European Commission by the Unit-
ed Kingdom in 2008,355 should be adopted.356 Civil society or-
ganizations mobilized, including The Omega Foundation, Am-
nesty International, Reprieve, and Penal Reform International, 
                                                                                                                                  
to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They 
shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the ap-
plication thereof in accordance with their respective powers”). 
351 Letter submitted to the High Court by Mr. Vince Cable, Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills, see Government not Legally Re-
quired to Impose Export Controls on Sodium Thiopental, but Decides to Do 
So, BRICK COURT CHAMBERS BARRISTERS (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://www.brickcourt.co.uk/news/29-11-2010---government-not-legally-
required-to-impose-export-controls-on-sodium-thiopental--but-decides-to-do-
so.asp.   
352 From Words to Deeds: Making the EU Ban on the Trade in ‘Tools of 
Torture’ a Reality, AMNESTY INT’L (2010), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/004/2010/en/fb4ff4cc-9a20-
44dc-8212-ebd9f4727f7b/eur010042010en.pdf. 
353 Id. 
354 European Parliament Resolution on Implementation of Council Regu-
lation, Concerning Trade in Certain Goods Which Could be Used for Capital 
Punishment, Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 17 June 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 236 E/17).   
355 Review of Export Control Legislation (2007) - Government’s End of 
Year Response, U.K. DEP’T. FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISE & REGULATORY REFORM 
6 (2008), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file49301.pdf. 
356 Meeting of the Committee on Common Rules for Export Products on 
June 29, 2010.  
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and they led a drive in the European Commission to amend 
Regulation 1236/2005.357 It was argued that such a clause 
would, “enable Member States to control the export of any 
goods which were destined for use in such acts as capital pun-
ishment, without creating onerous controls over legitimate 
business.”358 In this context, “legitimate business,” is the trad-
ing in goods designed for use in healthcare, as one of the main 
uses of sodium thiopental is as an anesthetic before surgery. 
In the proceeding European Parliament debate, Catherine 
Ashton, the EU High Representative, had promised that, “[a]ny 
shortcomings in the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 
1236/2005 must – and will – be addressed.”359 Following this 
commitment, December 20, 2011, the Commission extended 
Annexes II and III of Regulation 1236/2005 in response to con-
cerns about use of medicines made in the EU for capital pun-
ishment by means of lethal injection in the USA. 360  As a result 
the Commission stated that, “trade of certain anaesthetics, 
such as sodium thiopental, which can be used in lethal injec-
tions, to countries that have not yet abolished the death penal-
ty, will be tightly controlled,” and that, “exports of short and 
medium acting barbiturate anesthetic agents are subject to 
                                                          
357 Submission to the European Commission on amending Council Regu-
lation (EC) No. 1236/2005 to include drugs used in the ‘automatic drug injec-
tion systems for the purpose of execution of human beings by the administra-
tion of a lethal chemical substance,’ PENAL REFORM INT’L (Jan. 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Joint_ 
NGO_Submission_on_EU_Torture_Reg_sodium_thiopental.pdf. (PRI’s sub-
mission was signed by international NGOs who work towards the abolition of 
the death penalty; Amicus, Amnesty International, Ensemble Contre la Peine 
de Mort, International Federation for Human Rights, International Federa-
tion of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture, International Harm 
Reduction Association, Murder Victims’ Families for Human Rights, National 
Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers, Omega Research Foundation, Re-
prieve, Texas Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, and World Coalition 
Against the Death Penalty). 
358
 Id. at 4.  
359 Remarks of Vice President of the Commission Catherine Ashton, An-
nual Report on Human Rights (2008) – EU Policies in Favour of Human 
Rights Defenders – Trade in Goods Used for Torture, 2010 O.J. (Annex 13) 
109-10 (June 16, 2010) (European Parliament Debates), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+ 
CRE+20100616+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN. 
360 Press Release, European Commission, Commission Extends Control 
Over Goods Which Could Be Used for Capital Punishment or Torture, (Dec. 
20, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-
1578_en.htm.  
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prior authorization by national authorities.”361 This therefore, 
allows the Member States to have the final assessment of the 
export order. Whilst the use of barbiturate anesthetics is now 
regulated, the regional instrument still lacks specific textual 
amendment. However, another Amnesty International report 
was published in June 2012 entitled, “No More Delays. Putting 
an End to the EU Trade in ‘Tools of Torture,’”362 arguing for a 
wider-ranging review of the regulation and its implementation, 
including the amendment of the Regulation itself.363 
In addition, China has incorporated into its execution ar-
senal the lethal injection.364 Yunnan was the first province in 
China to authorize the method in February 2003.365 Yunnan 
had eighteen mobile execution vans with gurneys inside which 
are transported between prisons for executions. This is a new 
procedure adopted instead of the traditional Chinese method, 
which is a single bullet to the head.366 This alternative method 
of execution is an attempt to make the execution procedure 
comply with supposed humane standards.367 However, the 
Council regulation mandates that lethal injection is not a 
method that brings execution within the threshold of human 
rights standards. In the future EU dialogue with China and the 
United States, Regulation 1236/2005 may prove to be a useful 
ideological tool to develop arguments against the retentionist 
state’s legitimacy of lethal injection.     
                                                          
361 Id.  
362 See No More Delays, Putting an End to the EU Trade in “Tools of Tor-
ture,” AMNESTY INT’L (2012), available at https://doc.es.amnesty.org/cgi-
bin/ai/BRSCGI/act300622012en?CMD=VEROBJ&MLKOB=31776832020 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2013).   
363 Id. 
364 The Death Penalty in China: A Baseline Document, THE EUR. INITIATIVE FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 34 (2003), available at 
http://www.ecba.org/extdocserv/DP_Baseline.pdf; see also Empty Promises: Hu-
man Rights Protections and China’s Criminal Procedure Law in Practice, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CHINA (2001), available at http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/ 
files/oldsite/pdfs/Empty_Promises_Text.pdf (last visited July 17, 2013). 
365 Executed “according to law?” The Death Penalty in China, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (2004), http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/ASA17 
/003/2004/es/3342bc0c-d642-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/asa170032004en.html. 
366 Id.  
367 Baze, 553 U.S. at 66 (stating that lethal injection is not a per se viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution).  
72 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  4-1 
VIII.FUNDING OF ABOLITIONIST CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS  
The EU’s legal and political commitment is underpinned 
by financial support to civil society organizations fighting 
against the death penalty.  The aim is to promote the EU’s abo-
litionist agenda through political channels by facilitating stra-
tegic projects.  The EU considers the close co-operation with 
civil society in the fight against the death penalty as crucially 
important.368  The involvement of civil society is recognized as 
decisive both for the mobilization of expertise and the dissemi-
nation of knowledge required to develop public debate and ac-
countability throughout the abolitionist process.369 The EU 
funding for civil society organizations is channeled through the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (here-
inafter, “EIDHR”), which makes the EU the largest donor in 
this area worldwide.370   
The EIDHR is an independent EU financing tool aimed at 
supporting democracy, the rule of law, and promoting and pro-
tecting all human rights and fundamental freedoms world-
wide.371 It has been specifically designed to complement EU as-
sistance provided through bilateral development cooperation.372 
Overall, and beyond its support to abolitionist activities, under 
the EIDHR alone in 2007-2010, 1200 grants were made in 140 
countries for over € 331 million.373 
Abolition of the death penalty is one of the thematic priori-
ties for assistance under the EIDHR.374  Since 2000, it has 
funded around 50 projects worldwide (including in the USA), 
with an overall budget of more than € 23 million.375  Funded 
                                                          
368 EU Policy on Death Penalty, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/index_en.htm. (last visited Oct. 
10, 2013).  
369 Id. 
370 Death Has No Appeal, EUR. COMM’N, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/aid_6_0200_ 
leaflet_en.pdf.  
371 Id.  
372 Id. 
373 SEE EU ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 
WORLD IN 2010, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION 21, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights /index_en.htm.  
374 Council Regulation (EC) 1889/2006, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 20 Dec 2006 on Establishing a Financing Instrument for the 
Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide, 2006 O.J. (L 386) 5. 
375 The Abolition of the Death Penalty Worldwide, EIDHR COMPENDIUM 
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activities include awareness-raising, monitoring of conditions 
of implementation of the death penalty and the application of 
minimum international standards, legal reform to limit the use 
of or abolish the death penalty, as well as the provision of legal 
assistance in cases of particular concern and the promotion of 
the Second Optional Protocol (or similar regional instru-
ments).376 
The geographical scope of the supported activities varies 
from project to project.  Some projects focus on a thematic issue 
at a regional or global level. For instance, the EU supports the 
work of Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation377 (herein-
after, “MVFR”), a US based organization, founded in 1976, of 
family members of victims of both homicide and executions who 
oppose the death penalty in all cases.378  The purpose of 
MVFR’s work is to illustrate that the assumption is wrong that 
all survivors of murder victims are in favor of capital punish-
ment.379 In fact, many family members of murder victims 
around the world express exactly the opposite opinion claiming 
that it is possible to be both pro-victim and anti-death penalty 
and that the response to one human rights violation should not 
be another human rights violation. MVFR seeks to contribute 
to a criminal justice system that honors victims by preventing 
violence, not by perpetuating it.380   
                                                                                                                                  
2007-2010, (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/ 
human-rights/documents/compendium_abolition_of_the_death_penalty_en. 
pdf. 
376 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, GA Res. 44/128, 
December 15, 1989; Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death 
penalty, CETS 114, April, 28 1983; Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning abolition 
of the death penalty in all circumstances CETS 187, May 3, 2002; Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death 
Penalty,  OAS 73, Aug. 6, 1990.   
377 See generally MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILY FOR RECONCILLIATION, 
http://www.mvfr.org/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).  
378 Id.  
379 Id. 
380 This argument was cogently made by Soad El Khamal, the President 
of the Morocco Association for the Victims of Terrorism, at the 5th World 
Congress Against the Death Penalty, Madrid, June 12-15, 2013, when she 
spoken on the panel, “Terrorism and Abolition.” Khamal described how she 
lost her husband and son to a terrorist bombing in Casablanca in 2003, and 
she explained that she finds strength in helping victims of terrorist crimes, 
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The EIDHR has a particularly strong record in fighting the 
death penalty through capacity building in the judiciary.  For 
instance, from 2003 to 2005, the EU funded a project by the 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law (here-
inafter, “BIICL”) for capacity building of the criminal justice 
systems in Commonwealth Africa.381  The project provided 
training for African legal professionals.  Firstly, a conference 
was convened in Uganda in May 2004, which identified specific 
areas required for the success of the project.382 Subsequently, a 
legal training workshop was held in Malawi in October 2004, to 
train advocates and judges, which included a Judicial Colloqui-
um in Kenya in 2005.383 The project utilized the “train the 
trainers” concept and has proved an extremely successful en-
terprise.384 Since the BIICL project was initiated, several re-
markable developments have occurred in Africa: Cameroon es-
tablished a decree to commute all death sentences, in Kenya 
President Mwai Kibaki commuted 195 death sentences to life 
imprisonment, in Malawi 79 death sentences were commuted, 
and in Uganda the mandatory death sentence was abolished.385  
Other projects concentrate on the situation in one particu-
lar country.  By way of example, the project, “Promoting Judi-
                                                                                                                                  
and maintained that the death penalty for terrorists is not the answer to stop 
further terrorist attacks. On the same panel, Judge Hanne Sophie Greve, 
Vice President of the High Court in Bergen, Norway, member of the Interna-
tional Commission Against the Death Penalty, argued that the state must 
not reject the same dignity of the human being that terrorists destroy. She 
affirmed that to maintain the higher moral position “is not to kill to demon-
strate a respect for the sanctity of life.” See Jon Yorke, Report on the Fifth 
World Congress Against the Death Penalty, Madrid, June 11-16, 2013, 
BLOGSPOT (July 21, 2013), http://jonyorkehumanrights.blog 
spot.co.uk/2013/07/the-fifth-world-congress-against-death.html. 
381 EIDHR Activities 2000 – 2006, EUR. COMM’N 2 (2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/eidhr_compendi 
um_by_project_theme_final_15_09_08_en.pdf.  
382 For a full list of the developments in the BIICL project and Common-
wealth Africa, see generally BIICL, www.biicl.org/deathpenalty (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2013); Iya, Christou & Raymond, The Application of the Death Penalty 
in Commonwealth Africa, 13 AMICUS JOURNAL 17 (2005); HUMAN RIGHTS 
MANUAL AND SOURCEBOOK FOR AFRICA (Starmer & Christou eds., 2005). 
383 Id. 
384 Id. 
385 For a full list of the developments in the BIICL project and Common-
wealth Africa, see generally BIICL, www.biicl.org/deathpenalty (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2013); Iya, Christou & Raymond, The Application of the Death Penalty 
in Commonwealth Africa, 13 AMICUS JOURNAL 17 (2005); HUMAN RIGHTS 
MANUAL AND SOURCEBOOK FOR AFRICA (Starmer & Christou eds., 2005). 
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cial Discretion in the Restriction and Reduction of Death Pen-
alty use,” run by the Great Britain-China Centre, is exclusively 
looking at the situation in China.386  It aims at training local 
judges in judicial discretion and development of sentencing and 
evidence guidelines for trial procedures. With by far the high-
est execution rate in the world,387 China is of course of specific 
interest to the global abolitionist movement.388  The country 
has seen recent attempts to reduce the number of capital of-
fences and the work undertaken by the Great Britain-China 
Centre can take some credit for influencing this process, by 
providing an important forum for research and debate on the 
death penalty in China.389  
Of the 16 projects currently funded under the EIDHR, five 
have their activities in the USA.390 The Death Penalty Infor-
mation Center391 is partly funded by the EU and provides an 
extremely useful resource for capital representation in the US. 
Witness to Innocence (hereinafter, “WTI”),392 established in 
2005, is composed of, by and for exonerated death row survi-
vors and their loved ones in the US.393 WTI had a prominent 
role in advocating the abolitionist position in Illinois in March 
2011.394 In 2010, a 10-day speaking tour was conducted by 
three exonerated death row survivors from Illinois in key legis-
                                                          
386 See Death Penalty Reform, GREAT BRITAIN-CHINA CTR., 
http://www.gbcc.org.uk/death-penalty-reform.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).  
387 In 2011 Amnesty International identified China as the country that 
imposed the most executions, with an unknown precise figure but the organi-
zation estimate it to be over 1000, see Top 5 Executioners, AMNESTY INT’L, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/top-5-executioners-in-2011 (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
388 See Nicola Macbean, The Death Penalty in China: Towards the Rule of 
Law, in AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AND 
IMPLICATIONS (Jon Yorke ed., 2008).    
389 See also Roger Hood, Abolition of the Death Penalty: China in World 
Perspective, 1 CITY UNIV. OF HONG KONG L. REV. 1, 17 (2009).  
390 Death Penalty, EUR. COMM’N, http://www.eidhr.eu/highlights/ death-
penalty (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).  
391 See generally THE DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
392 The Abolition of the Death Penalty Worldwide, EIDHR COMPENDIUM 
2007-2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/ 
documents/compendium_abolition_of_the_death_penalty_en.pdf.  
393 See generally WITNESS TO INNOCENCE, 
http://www.witnesstoinnocence.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
394 Id. at http://www.witnesstoinnocence.org/exonerees/randy-steidl.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
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lative districts throughout the state, reaching nearly 500 citi-
zens in different venues.  WTI’s subsequent, “American 
DREAM Campaign,” project also received EIDHR funds and 
aimed at raising awareness of millions of citizens – and to in-
fluence political leaders – on the abolition of death penalty in 
several target US states.395   
IX. CONCLUSION: A HUMAN RIGHTS SUCCESS STORY  
In 2010 at the 12th Annual EU-NGO Forum of Human 
Rights in Brussels, the EU’s role in the worldwide abolition of 
the death penalty was a central theme and, Working Group 1 
on EU Instruments in the Fight Against the Death Penalty, 
was formulated to draft focused EU policies, and strategies for 
the performance of the European External Action Service.396 
The working group identified four themes: (i) coherence and 
consistency, (ii) cooperation, (iii) education and awareness rais-
ing, and (iv) efficiency and effectiveness.397 These themes set 
out the general abolitionist approach taken by the EU as re-
flected in this article. In the Policy Recommendations section, 
“Coherence and Consistency,” 1 (d) it states,  
[The EU should] deal with death penalty issues in connection 
with all other relevant human rights issues such as those relat-
ing to due process of law, right to a fair trial, the right to appeal, 
the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment (in connection with meth-
ods of execution) and the basic human right to dignity. Human 
rights are interconnected and issues surrounding the death pen-
alty should be viewed through the human rights lens.398 
This review of the EU’s internal and external policies for 
the abolition of the death penalty, has demonstrated that, on 
the whole, it is an identifiable success story of human rights 
and specifically in the evolution in the dignity of persons 
charged with crimes by the state. There is still a way to go, but 
the strengthening of the UNGA moratorium resolution will be 
the aim in the progress towards a world without the death 
penalty. The EU played a crucially important role in the suc-
                                                          
395 Focus on Innocence, ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, 
http://www.icadp.org/content/focus-innocence (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
396 12th EU NGO Forum on Human Rights, supra note 14.  
397 Id. at 2-4.  
398 Id. at 2. 
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cessful vote in 2007, and also the strengthening of the resolu-
tion in subsequent votes, with the most recent in December 
2012.399 Franklin Zimring observes that in Europe the abolition 
of the death penalty is both a human rights and a moral ques-
tion which is now settled, when he states,  
In an age dominated by negotiation and pragmatism, abolition is 
one of [the] very few issues that allows its adherents to hold on to 
a sense of transcendent virtue. This is no small matter in a world 
where so many rules and regulations are for sale.400    
In 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and 
the Peace Prize Committee highlighted the, “EU’s contribution 
for over six decades to the advancement of peace and reconcili-
ation, democracy and human rights in Europe.”401 For the EU, 
the abolition of the death penalty is a fundamental aspect of 
the promotion of peace, reconciliation, democracy, and human 
rights. William Schabas has confirmed that, “Europe signals 
that prohibition of capital punishment forms part of the central 
core of human rights. It now seems appropriate to consider abo-
lition of the death penalty to be such a customary 
norm…within Europe.”402 Schabas wrote this in 2002, and the 
norm has held strong and become a recognizable human rights 
success story of the European Union.      
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
EU Member States and Ratification of Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty,403 Protocol 
No. 6 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death pen-
alty,404 and No. 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the 
                                                          
399 European and World Day against the Death Penalty, supra note 15. 
400 ZIMRING, supra note 174, at 40. 
401 Nobel Peace Prize 2012 Awarded to the European Union, EUR. COMM’N 
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/news/eu_explained/121012_en.htm.  
402 Schabas, supra note 76, at 308-09. 
403 Protocol No. 6, supra note 53.  
404 Id.  
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abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances.405 
 
Member State Year of 
last exe-
cution  
Year of ratifica-
tion of the 2nd 
Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR 
Year of ratifica-
tion of Protocol 
No. 6 (1983) 
Year of rati-
fication of 
Protocol No. 
13 (2002) 
Austria  1950 1993 1984 2004 
Belgium 1950 1998 1998 2003 
Bulgaria 1989 1999 1999 2003 
Cyprus 1962 1999 2000 2003 
Czech Republic  1989 2004 1992 2004 
Denmark 1950 1994 1983 2003 
Estonia 1991 2004 1998 2004 
Finland 1994 1991 1990 2005 
France 1977 2007 1986 2008 
Germany 1981 1992 1989 2005 
Greece 1972 1997 1998 2005 
Hungary 1986 1994 1992 2003 
Ireland 1954 1993 1994 2002 
Italy 1947 1995 1988 2009 
Latvia 1996 2013 1999 2012 
Lithuania 1995 2002 1999 2004 
Luxembourg  1949 1992 1985 2006 
Malta  1943 1994 1991 2002 
Netherlands 1952 1991 1986 2006 
Poland 1988 Signed but not 
ratified 
2000 Signed but 
not ratified 
Portugal  1849 1990 1986 2003 
Romania 1989 1991 1994 2003 
Slovakia No exe-
cutions 
since 
inde-
pendenc
e 
1999 1992 2005 
Slovenia No exe-
cutions 
since 
inde-
pendenc
e 
1994 1994 2003 
Spain  1975 1991 1985 2009 
Sweden  1910 1990 1984 2003 
United Kingdom  1964 1999 1999 2003 
 
                                                          
405 Protocol No. 13, supra note 10.  
